

A COMPENDIOUS
VIEW
OF THE
Religion of Nature
DELINEATED:
BEING AN
ABRIDGMENT
OF
Mr. *Wollaston's* TREATISE
R Under that TITLE.

To which is added,
An APPENDIX
Concerning the
CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

Non sordidus auctor
Natura, verique.

HORAT.
VIRG.

Sed summa sequar fastigia rerum.

The SECOND EDITION Corrected.

LONDON,
Printed for THOMAS TRYE, near Grays-Inn Gate in Holborn.
MDCCXXXVII.

A COMPENDIOUS

V I E W

OF THE

Religion of Nature

DELINEATED

BEING AN

ABRIDGMENT

OF

MR. WOLFE'S



THE

ANTIENT

CONSTITUTION

CHRISTIAN RELIGION

THE

THE

THE

LONDON

MDCCXXVII



Advertisement.



THIS *Abridgment* was undertaken at first only for a private Use, and was therefore not originally intended to be published. As to it's Publication now, if the World receives any Benefit by it, there will be no Need of any Apology for it; but if not, it will be in vain to make one. The Reader however may the easier judge of the Performance by the References all along to the Pages of the Original; and the *Abridger* would have him also observe, that the Author is his Pattern in what he has writ of his own. Perhaps too it may be expected, that somewhat should be said here concerning the Author's No-
A 2 tion

ADVERTISEMENT.

tion of *Moral Good* and *Evil*. Let it be therefore observ'd, that by a Conformity to *Truth*, he means the same thing in the general, as a Conformity to the *Nature* of things, *p.* 13, and 22. or to the *Truth of the Case* consider'd in all those it's Circumstances, which come under a moral Consideration, *p.* 18, and 25. Which if any one opposes as the Rule of Morality, he ought to consider, by what other means it is possible for him, upon the foot of Nature, to judge what is fit or reasonable to be done, or what is conducive to the common Happiness, or the contrary; and as such, what is either *Good* or *Evil*, and consequently agreeable or disagreeable to the Divine Will. And if this Author has somewhere laid too much Stress on abstracted Truth, and determin'd too rigorously (more rigorously perhaps than his own Principles in the main might require) in an Instance or two, *p.* 29, 30; it may be an Argument that he is not infallible, but is no Diminution of the Truth of his Principles, as above explain'd: Not
to

ADVERTISEMENT.

to say that he has made further amends by what he has said of *Happiness* and *Reason*; and by his Doctrine that the Degrees of Guilt arising from the Violation of Truth vary with the Importance of Things. In a word, those who say that whatever *naturally tends* to the *common Happiness* is *good*, and whatever is the contrary is *evil*, say nothing against the Sentiments of this Author, if they mean such Happiness as is *true*, *vid. p. 24.* He says indeed that it is by the Practice of *Reason* and *Truth* only, that this Happiness is to be pursued, and can be attain'd. In which, if Truth and Reason are rightly understood, I suppose all good Moralists will agree.

to say that he has made further a-
 mount for what he has said of A-
 ppeal and Answer; and by his Do-
 cuments the Degrees of Guilt are
 taken from the Violation of Truth
 by with the Importance of Things.
 In a word, those who say that what
 ever naturally tends to the common
 Happiness is good, and whatever is
 the contrary is evil, say nothing a-
 gainst the Sentiments of this Author,
 if they mean such Happiness as is
 true and good. He says indeed
 that it is by the Practice of Reason
 and Virtue only, that this Happiness
 is to be pursued, and can be attained.
 In which, if Truth and Reason are
 rightly understood, I suppose all good
 Morals will agree.



T O

S^r Richard Steele.



*Was much pleased, SIR,
as well as surprized,
when you desired me
to draw up an Abridg-
ment of the Religion of
Nature delineated. The Respect I
have for you, will always engage
me to receive your Commands with
Pleasure; but in this, SIR, I am
more particularly obliged to you,
for giving me so delicate an Employ-
ment on a Performance which you
and the World so deservedly ad-
mire, and for your judging me in
any Measure fit for it. And give
me Leave to say, it is a just Pleasure*

DEDICATION.

to be so employ'd, and to be so well thought of by a Person, to whom the World owes some of the most celebrated Writings of the Age; of which too Religion and Morality are so much the Theme, and in which there are accordingly noble and excellent Sentiments of both.

As for what I have done in this Abridgment, I will only say, that I wanted not Inclination to do it well. Somewhat too as an Appendix I have added of my own, tho' I am sensible it may be thought in me too adventurous to have done so, tho' but to an Abridgment of so great a Writer. But if it were done by any hand equal to his own, there would be no need of defending it. The Christian Religion in all respects deserves the greatest and best Advocates; and if I was desirous to say somewhat concerning it, it was because somewhat of this kind is necessary to be said, to give us the true Advantages of the Religion of Nature.

Not that you or I can in the least suspect the Author not to have been
a Friend

DEDICATION.

a Friend to the Christian Institution. You have told me, he could not have writ, as he has done, had he not borrowed from it; and my own Sentiments the Reader will see towards the Conclusion; tho' if what I have said there be agreeable to those, who have Esteem for Mr. Wollaston's Memory, it is to you they are oblig'd for it, because you directed me to that Apology for him. But I will here say no more, but that you will find me endeavouring to follow the Author's Steps as well as I could, and where I fail, that I hope you will excuse your Friend, who tho' he cannot yet complain of old Age, yet upon other accounts has no reason to boast of his Advantages for much Study or Application. And thus, humbly requesting your favourable Acceptance, I commit the whole that follows to your Candour.

A Com-



A
Compendious View
OF THE
RELIGION OF NATURE
Delineated, &c.

SECT. I.
Of Moral Good and Evil.



THE Foundation of Religion lies in that Difference p. 7.
between the Acts of Men,
which distinguishes them
into *good, evil, indifferent.*
And there is certainly some general
Idea, or some *Rule*, by comparing the
aforesaid Acts with which it may appear,
to which kind they respectively belong.
That which the Author proposes, is ex-
plain'd as follows.

I. *Acts*

A Compendious View of the

P. 8.

I. *Acts morally good or evil, must be those of a Being capable of distinguishing, chusing, and acting for himself; or, more briefly, of an intelligent and free Agent: Because, in proper speaking, no act at all can be ascrib'd to that, which is not endued with these Capacities. For, if it acts at all, it acts under a Necessity incumbent on it from something else, and is therefore in reality only an Instrument in the Hand of that which imposes the Necessity; and cannot properly be said to act, but to be acted.* The Act must be the Act of an Agent, therefore not of his Instrument: And no Language or Philosophy ever ascrib'd *H^on* or *Mores* to what is only a Machine.

X. *Those Propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, Truth is the Conformity of those Words or Signs, by which Things are express'd, to the Things themselves.*

III. *A true Proposition may be denied, or Things may be denied to be what they are, by Deeds, as well as by express Words or another Proposition.* It is certain there is a Meaning in many Acts and Gestures, such as Weeping, Laughing, Frowns, &c. There are besides many Acts of other kinds, such as constitute the Character of a Man's Conduct in Life, which have in

Religion of Nature delineated.

3

in Nature a Signification, as plainly to be understood as if it was declar'd in Words: And therefore if what such Acts declare to be, is not, they must *contradict Truth*, as much as any false Proposition or Assertion can. Thus in the Words of a certain Author: " Suppose
" some Tyrant should command a Christian to burn Incense to *Jupiter*, without adding any thing of a verbal Abnegation of *Christ*: If the Christian should do this, would it not be manifest to all, that *by that very Act* he *denied him*", and consequently denied those Propositions which affirm him to be the *Christ*, a Teacher of true Religion, and the like? P. 11.

It may not be improperly observed P. 12. by the way, that the *Significancy* here attributed to Men's Acts, proceeds not always from Nature, but sometimes from Custom and Agreement among People, as that of Words and Sounds mostly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different Times and Places have different, or even contrary Significations; but those of the former kind, such as are here chiefly intended, have an *unalterable* Signification, and can by no Agreement or Force ever be made to express the contrary to it. From whence it appears, that *Facts* express more strongly, even

P. 13.

even than Words themselves *; or to contradict any Proposition by Facts, is a fuller and more effectual Contradiction, than can possibly be made by Words only. *Words* are but *arbitrary Signs* of our Ideas, or Indications of our Thoughts; but *Facts* bear certain *Respects* to Things as determinate and immutable as any *Ratio's* are in Mathematicks: For the Facts and the Things they respect are *just what they are*, as much as any two given Quantities are; and therefore the *Respects* interceding between those must be as *fix'd*, as the *Ratio* is which one of these bears to the other; that is, they must remain the same, and always speak the same Language, till things cease to be what they are.

P. 14.

IV. *No Act* (whether Word or Deed) of any Being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true Proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right. For nothing can interfere with any Proposition that is true, but it must likewise interfere with Nature (Truth being but a Conformity to Nature) and consequently be *unnatural*, or *wrong in Nature*. Moreover, if there is a Supreme Being, upon whom

* They profess that they know God; but in Works they deny him, Tit. i. 16.

the Existence of the World depends, and nothing can be in it but what he either causes or permits to be; then to own things *to be as they are*, is to own what he causes, or at least permits, *to be thus caused or permitted*: And this is to take things as he gives them, to go into his Constitution of the World, and to submit to his Will, reveal'd in the Books of Nature. To do this therefore must be agreeable to *his Will*: And if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it; and since (as we shall find in due time) there is a perfect Rectitude in his Will, certainly *wrong*. Lastly, to deny things to be as they are, is a Transgression of the great *Law of our Nature*, the Law of Reason: For Truth cannot be opposed, but Reason must be violated. Of which more in it's proper place. P. 15.

V. *What has been said of Acts inconsistent with Truth, may also be said of many Omissions or Neglects to act; that is, by these also true Propositions may be denied to be true; and then those Omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the same Reasons with those assign'd under the former Proposition.* P. 16.

It is not indeed always so easy to know *when or how far* Truth is violated by omitting, as by acting. Here therefore

fore more Latitude must be allow'd, and much must be left to every one's own Judgment and Ingenuity; yet there are *some Neglects* or Refusals to act, which are manifestly inconsistent with Truth. Thus, if a Man does not desire to prevent evils and to be happy, he denies both his *own* Nature, and the Nature and Definition of *Happiness* to be what they are. And then farther, willingly to neglect the *Means*, leading to any such End, is the same as not to propose that End, and must fall under the same Censure.

P. 17.

There are Omissions of other kinds, which also deserve to be mention'd, by being either *total* or *notorious*, or upon the score of some other Circumstance. Thus, if I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular Obligation, I do not by this deny them to be *poor*, any more than I should deny a Man to have a squalid Beard by not shaving him, or the like. *Many things* are here to be taken into Consideration (according to the next Proposition): Perhaps I might intrench upon Truth by *doing* this, and then I cannot by *not doing* it: But if I, being of Ability to afford now and then something in Charity to the Poor, should yet *never* give them any thing at all, I should *then* certainly deny the Condition

P. 18.

Religion of Nature delineated.

7

of the Poor, and my own to be what they are ; and thus Truth would be injured. So again,

If I should not say my Prayers at such a certain *Hour*, or in such a certain *Place* and *Manner*, this would not imply a Denial of the Existence of a God, his Providence, or my Dependence upon him; nay, there may be Reasons perhaps against *that particular* Time, Place, Manner. But if I should *never* pray to him, or worship him at all, such a *total* Omision would be equivalent to this Assertion, *There is no God, who governs the World, to be adored*: Which if there is such a thing, must be contrary to Truth. Also generally, and notoriously to neglect this Duty (let it be called so) though not quite always, with *favour*, if not directly proclaim the same Untruth.

Should I, in the last place, find a Man in any great Distress, alone, and without *present* Help like to perish; in this Extremity, if I refuse to give him my Assistance immediately according to my Ability, I deny his Case to be what it is; human Nature to be what it is; and even those Desires and Expectations, which I am conscious to my self I should have under the like Misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. *In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered not only what*

B

it

A Compendious View of the

it is it's self, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is capable of being denied by Facts and Practice, and the whole Description of the thing taken in. If a Man steals a Horse, and rides away upon him, he may be said, indeed by riding him, to use him as a Horse, but not as the Horse of another, who gave him no Licence to do this: He does not therefore consider him as being what he is, unless he takes in the Respect he bears to his true Owner. In short, all those Properties, Respects and Circumstances, which may be contradicted by Practice, are to be taken into Consideration: For otherwise, the thing consider'd is but imperfectly survey'd, and the whole Compass of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is in Part only, and in other respects perhaps as being what it is not.

P. 19.

P. 20.

VII. When any Act would be wrong, the forbearing that Act must be right: Likewise when the Omission of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it must be right, because of Contraries the Reason is contrary.

VIII. Moral Good and Evil are co-incident with Right and Wrong. For that cannot be good which is wrong, nor that evil which is right.

Religion of Nature continued.

IX. Every Act therefore of an intelligent and free Agent, and all those Omissions which interfere with Truth, are morally evil in some degree or other: The forbearing such Acts, and the acting in Opposition to such Omissions are morally good; and when any thing may be either done, or not, equally without the Violation of Truth, that thing is indifferent. By Truth is here meant any true Proposition whatsoever, whether containing matter of Speculation, or plain Fact. Everything should be taken to be what in Fact and Truth it is. And those words, in some Degree or other p. 21. were added, because neither all evil, nor all good Actions are equal. Those Truths which they respect, though they are equally true, may comprise matters of very different Importance, or more Truths may be violated one way than another; and then the Crimes committed by the Violation of them may be equally said to be Crimes, but not equal Crimes. Thus the Degrees of Evil p. 22. or Guilt are as the Importance and Number of Truths violated. On the other side, the Value of good Actions will rise at least in Proportion to the Degrees of Evil in the Omission of them: And therefore they cannot be equal any more than the opposite evil Omissions.

But to return to the Distinction between moral Good and Evil. Some have

been so wild as to deny there is any such thing: But from what has been said, it is manifest, that there is as certainly moral *Good* and *Evil*, as there is *true* and *false*; and that there is as natural and immutable a Difference between *those* as between *these*, the Difference at the bottom being indeed the same.

P. 23.

They who place all in *following Nature*, if they mean by that Phrase acting according to the Natures of things (that is treating things as being what they in Nature are, or according to Truth) say what is right. But this does not seem to be their Meaning. They who make *right Reason* to be the Law, by which our Acts are to be judged, say something more particular and precise. And it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right Reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right Reason is meant that which is found by the right Use of our rational Faculties, this is the same with Truth: And what is said by them will be comprehended in what is here said. But the Manner in which they have deliver'd themselves, is not yet explicite enough: It leaves Room for so many *Disputes*, and *opposite right Reasons*, that nothing can be settled, while every one pretends that *his Reason* is right. And beside, what is

here said, extends farther: For we are not only to respect those Truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even such *Matters of Fact*, as are fairly discover'd to us by our Senses. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which Way soever we come to the Knowledge of them. They who own nothing to be good but *Pleasure*, nothing evil but *Pain*, and distinguish things by their Tendencies to *this* or *that*, do not agree in what this Pleasure is to be placed, or by what Methods or Actings the most of it may be obtain'd. These are left to be Questions still: As Men have different Tastes, different Degrees of Sense and Philosophy, the same thing cannot be pleasant to all: And if particular Actions are to be proved by this Test, the Morality of them will be very uncertain; the same Act may be of *one* Nature to one Man, and of *another* to another. Beside, unless there be some strong *Limitation* added as a Fence for Virtue, Men will be apt to sink into gross Voluptuousness, as in fact the Generality of *Epicurus's* Herd have done (notwithstanding all his Talks of Temperance, Virtue, Tranquillity of Mind &c.) and the Bridle will be usurped by those Appetites which it is a principal part of all Religion, *natural* as well as any other, to curb and restrain. So these Men say what is in-

P. 24.

telligible indeed: But what they say is false; for not all Pleasures, but only such Pleasure as is *true*, or Happiness, (of which afterwards) may be reckon'd among the *Fines*, or *Ultima Bonorum*.

P. 25.

But if the *formal Reason* of moral Good and Evil be made to consist in a Conformity of Mens Acts to the *Truth of the Case* or the contrary, as it has been here explain'd, the *Distinction* seems to be settled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a *true Proposition* and *matter of Fact* is understood by every Body; so it will be easy for any one, so far as he knows any such Propositions and Facts, to compare not only *Words*, but also *Actions* with them. A very little Skill and Attention will serve to interpret even these, and discover whether they *speak Truth*, or not.

X. If there be moral Good and Evil distinguished as before, there is Religion: And such as may most properly be styled *natural*. By Religion is here meant nothing else but an Obligation to *do* (under which Word are comprehended Acts both of Body and Mind) what ought not to be omitted, and to *forbear* what ought not to be done: So that there must be Religion, if there are things, of which some ought not to be done, some not to be omitted.

P. 26.

omitted. But that there are such, appears from what has been said concerning moral Good and Evil. And then since there is *Religion* which follows from the Distinction between these; since this Distinction is founded in the Respect, which Mens Acts bear to Truth; and since no Proposition can be true, which expresses things otherwise than as they are in Nature: Since things are so, there must be Religion, which is founded in Nature, and may upon that account be most properly and truly called the *Religion of Nature* or *natural Religion*; the great Law of which Religion, the Law of Nature, or rather, (as we shall afterwards find Reason to call it) of the Author of Nature is;

XI. *That every intelligent; active, and free Being should so behave himself, as by no Act to contradict Truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is.*

Tho' to consider a thing as being something else than what it is, is an Absurdity indefensible, yet *Objections* may be made to what has been here advanced.

It may be said, that from hence it will follow, 1. That to treat my *Enemy* as such is to kill him, or *revenge* my self soundly upon him. 2. To use a *Creditor*, who is a Spendthrift, or one that knows not the Use of Money, or has no Occa-

tion for it, as *such*, is not to pay him. Nay farther, 3. If I *want Money*, don't I act according to Truth, if I take it from some Body else to supply my own Wants? and more, do not I act contrary to Truth, if I do *not*? 4. If one who plainly appears to have a *Design* of killing another, or doing him some great Mischief, if he can find him, should ask me where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to save Life, say I do not know, tho' that be false? 5. At this rate I may not in a *Frolick* break a Glass, or burn a Book: Because forsooth to use these things as being what they are, is to drink out of the one, not to break it; and to read the other, not to burn it. *Lastly*, How shall a Man *know* what is true? And if he can find out Truth, may he not want the *Power* of acting agreeably to it? As to the *first* Objection, if the Objector's Enemy, was *nothing more* than his Enemy, there might be some Force in it: But since he may be considered as something else beside that, viz. *a Man* and a *Fellow-citizen*, he must be used according to what he is in these other Respects; as well as in that in which he is denominated the Objector's Enemy. Beside, the Objector should act with Respect to *himself* as being what he is; a Man himself in such and such Circumstances, and one who has given up
all

all Right to *private Revenge* (for that is the thing meant here.) If Truth therefore be observed, the Result will be this: The Objector must treat his Enemy as *something compounded* of a Man, a Fellow-citizen, and an Enemy, all three; *that is*, he must only prosecute him in such a Way, as is agreeable to the Statutes and Methods, which the Society have oblig'd themselves to observe. And even as to *legal Prosecutions*, many things ought to be consider'd. In Matters of Importance, one will find himself oblig'd, in Duty and Submission to Truth, to take Refuge in the Laws. But in *trifling* P. 18.
or *more tolerable* Instances, we should act against Truth, if we should be at more Charge or Hazard in prosecuting another than we can afford, or the thing lost or in Danger is worth; should treat one that is an Enemy in little things, as a *great* one; or should deny to make some Allowances, and *forgive* such Pccadillos, as the common Frailty of human Nature makes it necessary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. *Lastly*, in Cases, of which the Laws of the Place take no Notice, Truth and Nature will be sufficiently observed, if we take the most *prudent* Measures, that are compatible with the Character of private Persons, to assuage the Malice of our Adversaries, or prevent the Effects

fects of it; or perhaps, if we should only *not* use them as Friends. For to do this, would be to cancel the natural Differences of things, and confound Truth with Untruth.

The Debtor in the second Objection, if he acts as he says there, does not only make himself the Judge of his Creditor, which he is not, but directly denies the Money, which is the Creditor's, to be the Creditor's. To pay a Man what is *due* to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant &c. or any other Truth; that Act has no such Signification. It only signifies, that he who pays *thinks* it due to the other; and this it naturally doth signify.

As to the third Objection, acting according to Truth, as that Phrase is used in the Objection, is not the thing required by the Rule; but, so to act that *no Truth* may be denied by any Act. Not taking from another Man his Money by Violence, is a Forbearance, which does not signify, that I do not want Money, or which denies any Truth. But taking it, *denies* that to be his, which by the Supposition *is his*. Even in the Case of a Man's wanting Money for *Necessaries*, and of his having incurr'd this Want thro' some *Misfortune*, which he could not prevent; there are Ways of expressing this Want, or acting accord-
ing

ing to it, such as honest Labour and Industry, or the like, without trespassing upon Truth. But if there is no way, by which he can help himself without the Violation of Truth, (which can scarce be supposed) he must take it as his Fate.

As to the fourth Objection, it is certain that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes *Murder*: Whoever is accessory to that, offends against *many Truths of great Weight*. But tho' merely to deny Truth by Words (that is, when they are not productive of Facts to follow; as in judicial Transactions, bearing Witness, or passing Sentence) is not equal to a Denial by *Facts*; tho' an *Abuse* of Language is allowable in this Case, if ever in any; and tho' one might look on a Man in such a fit of Rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a *Man* but a *Mad-man*: Yet Truth is *sacred*, and there are other Ways of coming off with Innocence, by giving timely Notice to the Man in Danger, or the like.


In Answer to the fifth Objection, two things ought to be regarded, 1. That tho' to act against Truth in any Case is wrong; yet the Degrees of Guilt varying with the Importance of things, in some Cases the Importance one way or t'other may be so little as to render the Crime *evanescent*,

A Compendious View of the

nescent, or *almost* nothing. And 20 That *inanimate* Beings cannot be consider'd as capable of wrong Treatment, if the Respect they bear to living Beings is separated from them. The Drinking-glass before mention'd could not be consider'd as such, or be what it *now* is, if there was no drinking Animal to own and use it. Nothing can be of any Importance to that thing its self, which is void of all Life and Perception. So that when we compute what such things are, we must take them as being what they are *in Reference* to things that have Life.

The last and most material *Objection*, or *Question* rather, shall be *answer'd* by and by. In the mean time, if in any particular Case Truth is inaccessible, then this will be true, *that the Case* is doubtful: And to act agreeably to this Truth is to be not opiniative, nor obstinate, but modest, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be *on the safer side*. And as to the want of *Power* to act agreeably to Truth, that cannot be known till Trials are made: And if any one doth try and do his Endeavour, he may take to himself the Satisfaction, which he will find in Sect. IV.

SECT. II.



SECT. II.

Of Happiness.

THAT, which demands next to be consider'd, is *Happiness*; as being in it self most confierable; and as being indeed so nearly allied to Truth, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the Respects due to one, unless we regard the other. Happiness must not be denied to be what it is: And it is by the Practice of Truth that we aim at that Happiness, which is true.

I. *Pleasure is a Consciousness of something agreeable, Pain of the contrary.* Here let these things be observ'd; p. 32.

1. *Pleasures and Pains are proportionable to the Perceptions and Sense of the Persons affected with them.*

2. *Mens respective Happiness or Pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the Persons themselves, whose they are; or according to the Thoughts and Sense which they have of them.* If that Prince, who having Plenty and Flocks many, yet ravish'd the poor Man's single Ewe-lamb

out

P. 34,

out of his Bosom, reckon'd the poor Man's Loss to be not greater, than the ~~Loss of one of his Lambs~~ would have been to him, he must be very defective in moral Arithmetick, and little understood the Doctrine of Proportion. Every Man's Happiness is *his* Happiness, what it is to him; and the Loss of it is answerable to the Degrees of his Perception, ~~to his Manner of taking things, to his Wants and Circumstances.~~

3. *How judicious and wary ought Princes, Lawgivers, Judges, Juries, and even Masters to be?* They ought not to consider so much what a stout, resolute, obstinate, harden'd Criminal may bear, as what the weaker Sort, or at least (if that can be known) the Persons immediately concern'd can bear: *That is*, what any Punishment would be to them. For it is certain all Criminals are not of the former Kind, and therefore should not be used, as if they were. Some are drawn into Crimes, which may render them obnoxious to publick Justice, they scarce know how themselves: Some fall into them through Necessity, Strength of Temptation, Despair, Elasticity of Spirits and a sudden Eruption of Passion, Ignorance of Laws, Want of good Education, or some natural Infirmary or Propension: And some who are really innocent, are oppress'd by the Iniquity or Mistakes

Mistakes, of Judges, Witnesses, Juries, or perhaps by the Power and Zeal of a Faction, with which their Sense or their Honesty has not permitted them to join. What a Difference must there be between the Sufferings of a poor Wretch sensible of his Crime or Misfortune, who would give a World for his Deliverance, if he had it, and those of a sturdy *Veteran* in Roguery; in short, between a tender Nature and a Brickbat!

4. *In general, all Persons ought to be very-careful and tender, where any other is concern'd.* Otherwise they may do they know not what. For no Man can tell, by himself, or any other Way, how another may be affected.

5. *There cannot be an equal Distribution of Rewards and Punishments by any stated human Laws.* Because (among other Reasons) the same thing is rarely either the same Gratification, or the same Punishment to different Persons.

6. *The Sufferings of Brutes are not like those of Men.* They perceive by Moments, without Reflection upon past or future, upon Causes, Circumstances, &c. Time and Life without thinking are next Neighbours to nothing, to no-time and no-Life. And therefore to kill a Brute is to deprive him of a Life, or a Remainder of Time, that is equal to little more than nothing: Tho' this may perhaps be

P. 35.

be more applicable to some Animals than to others. That which is chiefly to be taken Care of in this Matter, is, that the Brute may not be kill'd unnecessarily; when it is kill'd, that it may have as few Moments of Pain, as may be; and that no Young be left to languish.

II. *Pain consider'd in it's self is a real Evil, Pleasure a real Good.*

III. *By the general Idea of Good and Evil, Pleasure is in it's self desireable, Pain to be avoided,*

IV. *Pleasure compared with Pain may be either equal, or more, or less: Also Pleasures may be compared with other Pleasures, and Pains with Pains.* That this Proposition is true, appears from the various Pursuits of Men (tho' in some particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less;) all tending to gain such Advantages, as they think do exceed all their Trouble; and shewing, that Men prefer one Sort of Pleasure to another, and submit to one Sort of Pain, rather than to have another.

p. 36. V. *When Pleasures and Pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: When*

the

the one exceeds, the Excess gives the true Quantity of Pleasure or Pain.

VI. *As therefore there may be true Pleasure, and Pain; so there may be some Pleasures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into nothing, but may even degenerate into Pain, and ought to be reckoned as Pains; and on the other Hand some Pains, that may be annumerated to Pleasures. Thus the Natures of Pleasures and Pains may be varied, and sometimes transmuted: Which ought never to be forgot. Nor this neither: As in the Sense of most Men, perhaps a little Pain will weigh against a great deal of Pleasure; so possibly there may be some Pains which exceed all Pleasures, that is, such Pains as no Man would chuse to suffer for any Pleasure whatever, or at least any that we know of in this World. So that it is possible the Difference, or Excess of Pain, may rise so high as to become immense; and then the Pleasure to be set against that Pain will be but a Point or Cypher, a Quantity of no Value.*

VII. *Any Being may be said to be so far happy, as his Pleasures are true. That* P. 37.
cannot be the Happiness of any Being, which is bad for him: Nor can Happiness be disagreeable. It must be some-
C thing

A Compendious View of the

thing therefore, that is both agreeable and good for the Possessor. Now present Pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who enjoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his Good, or good for him: This therefore cannot be his *Happiness*. Nor, again, can that Pleasure be reckon'd *Happiness*, for which one pays the full Price in Pain: Because these are Quantities, which mutually destroy each other. But yet since *Happiness* is something, which by the general Idea of it, must be desirable, and therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of Pleasure: And this, from what has been said, can only be such Pleasure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's *Happiness* will be as his true Quantity of Pleasure. [*That is*, according to what he has of that kind of Pleasure, which is *true*, clear of all Discounts and future Payments, or Abatements in Respect of any Pain that may attend or follow it. *Vid. p. 36.*]

As to mere Indolence resulting from Insensibility, or join'd with it, it is no more a *Happiness*, than it is an *Unhappiness*; upon the Confine of both, but neither. A Sense indeed of being free from Pains and Troubles is attended with *Happiness*: But then the *Happiness* flows from

Religion of Nature continued.

25

from the Sense of the Case, and is a positive Happiness.

VIII. *That Being may be said to be ultimately happy in some Degree or other, the Sum total of whose Pleasures exceeds the Sum of all his Pains: And so on the other side, that Being may be said to be ultimately Unhappy, the Sum of all whose Pains exceeds that of all his Pleasures.* p. 38.

IX. *To make it's self happy is a Duty, which every Being, in Proportion to it's Capacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent Being may be supposed to aim at in general. And therefore,*

X. *We cannot act with Respect either to our selves, or other Men, according to Truth, unless both we and they are consider'd as Beings susceptible of Happiness and Unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other.*

XI. *As the true and ultimate Happiness of no Being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with Truth, and denies the Natures of Things; so neither can the Practice of Truth make any Being ultimately unhappy. For that which contradicts Nature and Truth, opposes the Will of the Author of Nature, which it were absurd to suppose can be a Means of Happiness,*

piness, unless any could be more powerful than he. And it is also absurd to think, that any Man should be finally miserable, only for *conforming* himself to Truth, or the Nature and Constitution of things, proceeding from a good as well as powerful Being.

P. 39.

XII. *The genuine Happiness of every Being must be something, that is not incompatible with, or destructive of it's Nature, or the superior or better Part of it; if it be mix't.* For Instance, nothing can be the true Happiness of a *rational* Being, that is inconsistent with *Reason*. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational Being, which is not agreeable to Reason, it is plain his Reason is lost, his Nature deprest, and that he now lists himself among *Irrationals*, at least as to that particular.

P. 40.


XIII. *Those Pleasures are true, and to be reckon'd into our Happiness, against which there lies no Reason.* For then there is always a Reason for it, included in the Term. So when there is no Reason for undergoing Pain (or venturing it) there is one against it.

XIV. To conclude this Section, *The Way to Happiness and the Practice of Truth incur the one into the other.* As no Being

can

can be truly and ultimately happy, as has been before observ'd, by means of any thing that is contrary to Truth; so whatever produces Happiness, must be something which is consistent and *co-incident* with it.

Two Things then which are to be religiously regarded in all our Conduct, are *Truth* and *Happiness*, that is, such Pleasures, as accompany or follow the Practice of Truth, or are not inconsistent with it.



SECT. III.

*Of Reason, and the Ways of
- discovering Truth.*

IN the next Place it is proper to say *P. 41.*
something concerning the Means of
knowing what is *true*,

I. *If a Proposition be true, it is always
so in all the Instances and Uses, to which it P. 43,
is applicable. For otherwise it must be
both true and false. Therefore,*

II. *By the help of Truths already known
more may be discovered. For 1. Those*

Inferences which arise *presently*, from the Application of general Truths, to the particular Things and Cases contain'd under them, must be just. As for Example; *the Whole is bigger than a Part: Therefore A* (some particular thing) *is more than half A.* For it is plain that *A* is contain'd in the *Idea* of Whole, as Half *A* is in that of Part. So that if the antecedent Proposition be true, the Consequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and must also be true. 2. All those *Conclusions*, which are derived thro' mean Propositions that are true, and by just Inferences, will be as true as those, from which they are deriv'd. The Meaning is this: Every just Consequence is *founded in some known Truth*, by Virtue of which one Thing follows from another, after the Manner of Steps in an *Algebraick Operation*: And if Inferences are so founded, and just, the things inferred must be true, if they are made from true Premises. And if the last, and all the intermediate Inferences be as right, as the first is supposed to be, it is no Matter to what length the Process is carried. All the Parts of it being locked together by Truth, the last Result is derived thro' such a Succession of mean Propositions, as render it's Title to our Assent not worse by being long.

P. 44.

III. *Reason is a Faculty of making such P. 45.*
Inferences and Conclusions, as were men-
tion'd under the preceding Proposition,
from any thing known or given.

IV. *There is such a thing as right Rea- P. 48.*
son: Or Truth may be discovered by Rea-
soning. The Word Reason has several
Acceptations, sometimes it is us'd for that
Power mention'd in the last Proposition,
as when we say, Man is a being indued
with Reason. And then the Sense of
the Proposition must be this: That there
is such a Use to be made of this Power
as is right, and will manifest Truth.
Sometimes it seems to be taken for those
general Truths, of which the Mind pos-
sesses it's self from the intimate Know-
ledge of it's own Ideas, and by which it
is govern'd in it's Inferences and Con-
clusions; as when we say, such a thing is
agreeable to Reason: For that is as much
as to say, it is agreeable to the said ge-
neral Truths, and that authentick Way
of making Deductions, which is founded
in them. And then the Sense of this
Proposition is, that there are such gene-
ral Truths, and such a right Way of in-
ferring. Again; sometimes it seems to
stand only for some particular Truth, as
it is apprehended by the Mind with the
Causes of it, or the Manner of it's De-
rivation from other Truths: That is, it,

differs not from Truth except in this one Respect, that it is considered not barely in it's self, but as the Effect or Result of a Process of reasoning: Or it is Truth with the Arguments for our Assent, and it's Evidence about it; as when it is said, *that such or such an Assertion is Reason*. And then the Sense of the Proposition is, that there are Truths so to be apprehended by the Mind. So all comes to this at last: Truth (or there are Truths, which) may be discovered, or found to be such, *by reasoning*.

If it were not so, our rational Faculties, the noblest we have, would be vain. *Besides*, that it is so, appears from what we know within our selves. Not but that Error too often happens thro' various Causes, in Opposition to which we are oblig'd to say *right Reason* instead of *Reason* only. Nor is Truth to be discovered in *every* Case: That would imply an Extent of Knowledge, which we cannot pretend to.

P. 49.

P. 50.

V. *To act according to right Reason, and to act according to Truth are in Effect the same thing*. For in which Sense soever the Word *Reason* is taken, it will stand either for Truth it's self, or for that, which is instrumental in discovering and proving it to be such: And then with Respect to this latter Sense, whoever is guided

guided by that Faculty, whose Office consists in distinguishing and pointing out Truth, must be a Follower of Truth, and act agreeably to it.

VI. *To be govern'd by Reason is the general Law impos'd by the Author of Nature upon them, whose uppermost Faculty is Reason: As the Dictates of it in particular Cases are the particular Laws to which they are subject.* If Reason be the uppermost Faculty, it has a Right to controll the rest by being *such*. And it is plain, that Reason is of a commanding Nature. It enjoins this, condemns that, only allows some other things, and will be paramount, if it is at all. Now a Being, who has such a determining and governing Power, so plac'd in his Nature, as to be essential to him, is a Being certainly fram'd to be govern'd by that Power.

VII. *If a rational Being, as such, is under an Obligation to obey Reason, and this Obedience, or Practice of Reason, is in Effect the same Thing with the Observation of Truth, it plainly follows, 1. That* what is said Sect. I. Prop. IV. must be true with Respect to such a Being for this farther Cause; because to him nothing can be right, that interferes with Reason; and nothing can interfere with Truth, but it must interfere with Reason:
For

For whatever is known to be true, Reason either finds it, or allows it to be such. 2. That there is to a rational Being such a thing as *Religion*, which may also upon this farther Account be properly called *natural*. For certainly to obey the Law, which the Author of his Being has given him, is Religion: And to obey the Law which he has given or revealed to him by making it to result from the right Use of his own natural Faculties, must be to him his *natural Religion*. 3. A careful Observation of Truth, the Way to Happiness, and the Practice of Reason, are in the Issue the same thing. For of the two last, each falls in with the first, and therefore each with other. And so at last, natural Religion is grounded upon this tripple and strict Union of *Truth, Happiness, and Reason*: And it's truest Definition is, *the Pursuit of Happiness by the Practice of Reason and Truth*.

Let it be here by the Way observ'd, that in judging of Right and Truth, every one must judge for himself. For since all reasoning is founded originally in the Knowledge of one's own private *Ideas*, by Virtue of which he becomes conscious of some first Truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his Steps in his Pursuits after more Truths, &c. the *Criterion*, or that by which he tries his own Reasonings, and

knows them to be right, must be the *internal* Evidence he has already of certain Truths, and the Agreeableness of his Inferences to them. Therefore to demand another Man's Assent to any Thing without conveying into his Mind such Reasons, as may produce a Sense of the Truth of it, is to erect a Tyranny over his Understanding, and to demand a Tribute which it is *not possible* for him to pay. It is true Men may be *assisted* in making their Judgment of Things; but it is in order to produce such a Light in them, that by it *they* may see and judge for themselves; and find the Reasonableness of the Opinion *p. 53.* propos'd to them *within themselves*. Not that Men must in all Cases *act* according to their private and single Judgments. In Respect of such Things, as concern themselves *only*, or such as are left open to every Man's own Sense, they may and ought; only preserving a due Deference to them who differ from them, and are known upon other Occasions to have more Knowledge and Literature than themselves: But when a Society is concern'd, and hath determin'd any Thing, it may be consider'd as one Person, of which he, who dissents from the rest, is only perhaps a small Particle; and then his Judgment will be in a Manner absorbed in that of the Majority,

rity, or of them to whom the Power of judging is intrusted. *Vid. p. 178.*

P. 55.

VIII. *The Reports of Sense are not of equal Authority with the clear Determinations of Reason, when they happen to differ.* For no Man doth or can pretend to believe his Senses, when he has a Reason against it. Which is an irrefragable Proof that Reason is above Sense and controlls it. But,

IX. *The Reports of Sense may be taken for true, when there is no Reason against it.* Because when there is no Reason not to believe, that alone is a Reason for believing them. And therefore,

X. *In this Case to act according to them, is to act according to Reason, and the great Law of our Nature.*

Thus there are *two* Ways, by which we may assure our selves of the Truth of many Things; or at least may attain such a Degree of Certainty, as will be sufficient to determine our *Practice*, by Reason, and by Sense under the Government of Reason; that is, when Reason supports it, or at least doth not oppose it. By the former we discover speculative Truths; by the latter, or both together Matters of Fact.

XI. When

XI. *When Certainty is not to be had, it must be consider'd, which side of the Question is the more probable.* Probability will generally shew it's self upon the Application of these and such like Rules.

1. That may be reckon'd probable, *P. 56.*

which, in the Estimation of Reason, appears to be more agreeable to the *Constitution* of Nature. If a Parent educates his Child virtuously, he will be more likely to do well, than if he was left to himself to be carried away by his own Passions, or the Influence of those, into whose Hands he might fall, the Bias of the former lying towards Vice and Misery in the End, and the Plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. 2. When any *Observation* hath *P. 57.*

hitherto *constantly* held true, or *most commonly* proved to be so, it has by this acquired an establish'd Credit; the Cause may be presumed to restrain it's former Force, and the Effect may be taken as probable, if in the Case before us there doth not appear some Reason for Exception. There is no demonstrative Argument to prove, that any particular Man will die: But yet he must be more than mad, who can presume upon Immortality here, when he finds so many Generations all gone to a Man, and the same *Enemies* that have laid them prostrate, still pursuing their Victories. 3.

When

P. 58.

When neither Nature nor other Observations point out the probable Conjecture to us, we must be determin'd (if we need be determined at all) by the Reports and Sense of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the best Skill we have, * to be most *knowing* and *honest*. Of all the Rules the *first* deserves the principal Regard: The other two are of Use, when Nature so utterly excludes us from her Bosom, that no Opportunity is allow'd of making a Judgment. *Lastly*, when Nature, the frequent Repetition of the same Event, and the Opinion of the best Judges concur to make any thing probable, it is so in the highest Degree.

P. 59.

To conclude; that we ought to follow *Probability*, when Certainty leaves us, is plain: Because then it becomes the *only* Light we have. For unless it is better to wander and fluctuate in *absolute* Uncertainty than to follow such a Guide, it must be reasonable to direct our Steps

* *Non Numero hac judicantur, sed Pondere*, as Tully speaks. Therefore I cannot without a Degree of Indignation find a Sort of Writers pleasing themselves with having discovered unciviliz'd Nations, which have little or no Knowledge of the Deity, &c. And then applying their Observations to the Service of Atheism. As if Ignorance could prove any thing, or alter it's Nature by being general.

by

by Probability, when we have nothing *P. 59.*
clearer to walk by. And if it be rea-
sonable, we are oblig'd to do it by
Prop. VI.

As to the principal Causes of *Error*,
they are such as these. 1. Want of *Fa-*
culties; when Men pretend to judge of
Things above them. As some assert
what they have no Reason to assert; so
others deny what there is the highest
Reason to believe, only because they
cannot *comprehend it*. 2. Want of pro-
per Qualifications; as when illiterate Peo-
ple invade the Provinces of Scholars, &c. *P. 60.*
3. The strength of Appetites, Passions,
Prejudices. Among other Prejudices,
there is one of a particular Nature, which
may be observ'd to be one of the *greatest*
Causes of modern Irreligion. Whilst
some Opinions and Rites are carried to
an absurd Height, even Men of com-
mon Sense many times see thro' them;
and then out of an excessive Renitence,
not separating that which is true from
that which is false, they fall into the
contrary Extreme, a Contempt of all
Religion in general. The Sum of all in
a few Words is this: Many Qualificati-
ons are requisite in order to judge of
some Truths, and particularly those *P. 62.*
which are of greatest Importance: Prop-
er Learning and Penetration, Vacancy
from Business, a Detachment from the
Interest

Interest of all Parties, much Sincerity and a perfect *Resignation* to the Government of Reason and Force of Truth; which are things not to be reconcil'd with the usual Ignorance, Passions, tumultuary Lives, and other Circumstances which carry most Men transverse.



SECT. IV.

Of the Obligations of imperfect Beings with Respect to their Power of acting.

P. 61.

THIS Question is also proper to be consider'd, viz. *If a Man can find out Truth; may he not want the Power of acting agreeably to it?* On which let these things be observ'd.

I. So far as any Being has no Power, or Opportunity of doing any thing, so far is that Being incapable of any Obligation of doing it. It is a Truth confess'd by all, that no Body is oblig'd to Impossibilities. From hence it follows,

II. That

II. *That the Obligations of Beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their Faculties, Powers, Opportunities: And not more.* p. 63.


III. *To endeavour, (or to do what one can) may fitly express the Use of all the Opportunities and Powers, that any intelligent and active, but imperfect Being hath to act; and the Obligations of such Beings reach, as far as their Endeavours may. From whence it follows in the last place.*

IV. *That they who are capable of discerning Truth, tho' not all Truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho' not always or in all Cases, are nevertheless oblig'd to do these, as far as they are able. Or, it is the Duty of such a Being sincerely to endeavour to practise Reason; not to contradict any Truth, by Word or Deed; and in short, to treat every thing as being what it is.*

Thus the general Duties of rational Beings, mention'd in or resulting from the preceding Sections, are brought together and finally fixt under the *Correction* or *Limitation* in this last Proposition. This is the Sum of their Religion, from which no Exemption or Excuse lies. Every one can endeavour, every one can do what he can; but in order to that every one ought to be in earnest, and to exert himself heartily, not stifling his own
D Conscience,

P. 64.

Conscience; not dissembling, suppressing or neglecting his own Powers. I am persuaded, if Men would be serious, and put forth themselves, they would find by Experience, that *much* is left to their own Conduct. Up and try.



SECT. V.

Truths relating to the Deity. Of his Existence, Perfection, Providence, &c.

P. 65.

IT has been shewn in the former Sections in what the Nature of *moral Good and Evil* consists, viz. a Conformity or Disagreement to *Truth*, and those Things which are co-incident with it, *Reason and Happiness*; also how Truth is discover'd, by *Sense or Reason*, or both. It is now proper to specify some of those *Truths*, which are of the greatest Importance and Influence. They respect principally either the *Deity, ourselves*, or the *rest of Mankind*. The first are the Subject of *this Section*.

I. *When there is a Series of Causes and Effects, there must necessarily be a Cause in Nature prior to the rest, uncaused; or there*

there must be some independent Being, upon whom it doth originally depend.

If *Z* (some body) be put into Motion by *T*, *T* by *X*, and *X* by *W*, it is plain that *X* moves *T*, and *T* moves *Z* only as they are first moved, *X* by *W*, and *T* by *X*; that *Z*, *T*, *X* are moved, or rather *Z* more *T* more *X*, that is, added one to the other, and so taken together, are *one moved*; that *W* stands here as the first Mover, or Author of the Motion, unmoved by any other; and therefore without *W* there would be a *Moved* without a *Mover*, which is absurd; and lastly, that of what Length soever the *Series* may be, the Case will be ever the same, *that is*, if there be no *first Mover* unmoved, there must be a *Moved* without a *Mover*.

The Reasoning is the same in respect P. 66. of a Series of Causes and Effects: For without a supreme Cause, depending upon nothing, and on which the rest depend, the whole will be an Effect without an Efficient, or a Dependent without anything to depend upon; that is, *dependent, and not dependent*. Even if the *Series* be supposed to ascend infinitely (though that it self is perhaps an absurd Supposition, see the Notes, p. 66.) yet it will still be but an infinite Series, or Succession of Effects, which will not less than a finite Series, require a Cause

without it's self, but *infinitely more*. An *infinite* Succession of Effects will require an *infinite* Efficient, or a Cause *infinitely effective*; so far is it from requiring none.

Suppose a *Chain* hung down out of the Heavens from an *unknown* Height, and though every Link of it gravitated towards the Earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept it's Situation; and upon this a Question should arise, *what supported or kept up this Chain?* Would it be a sufficient Answer to say, that the *first* (or lowest) Link hung upon the *second*, (or that next above it) the *second* or rather the *first and second together* upon the *third*, and so on *ad infinitum*? For what holds up the whole? A *Chain* of *ten* Links would fall down, unless something able to bear it hinder'd; one of *twenty*, if not staid by something of a yet greater Strength, in Proportion to the Increase of Weight; and therefore one of *infinite* Links certainly, if not sustain'd by something *infinitely* strong, and capable to bear up an infinite Weight. And thus it is in a *Chain* of Causes and Effects tending, or as it were *gravitating* towards some End. The last (or lowest) depends or (as one may say) is *suspended* upon the Cause above it; this again, if it be not the first Cause, is suspended as an Effect upon something above it, &c. And if

they should be infinite, unless (agreeably to what has been said) there is some *Cause* p. 68. upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite Effect without an Efficient; and to assert there is any such thing, would be as great an *Absurdity*, as to say, that a finite or *little* Weight wants something to sustain it, but an infinite one or the *greatest* does not.

II. *A Cause or Being, that has no superior Cause, and therefore is unproduc'd, and independent, must be Self-existent; that is, such is his Nature, that he cannot but be.* The Root of his Existence (in that he is *independent* and *uncaus'd*) can be sought for no where, but in his own Nature.

III. *There must be such a Being.* That Series of Causes and Effects which we know is in the World proves it, from what has been already said: Besides, otherwise nothing could be at all. For the *Universe* could not produce *it's* self, nor could any *Part* of it produce *it's* self, and then produce the rest; because this is supposing a Thing to *act* before *it is*.

IV. *Such a Being must be not only eter-* P. 69.
nal, but infinite. *Eternal* he must be, because there is no Way by which such a Being can either begin, or cease to be,

Existence being of his Essence; that is, as was before mention'd, such is his Nature, that he cannot but be: And *infinite* he must be, because he can be limited by no other as to his Existence. For if there was any Being able to limit him, he must be *inferior* to that Being, and in that Case *dependent*. Beside, if his *Presence* was any where excluded, he would not be *there*; and if *not there*, he might be suppos'd to be *not elsewhere*; and thus he might be suppos'd *not to be at all*. But such a Being, as is describ'd in the second Prop. cannot so much as be suppos'd *not to be*, [in that Existence is essential to him; or his Nature is such, that he cannot but be.]

V. *Such a Being is above all Things, that fall under our Cognizance; and therefore his Manner of Existence is above all our Conceptions.* For he is a *necessary* Existent, [that is, he cannot but be;] but nothing within our Comprehension is of this Kind. And adequate Ideas of Eternity and Infinity are above us, as *Finites*. Yet we may be sure that

P. 70.

VI. *He exists in a Manner, which is perfect.* For he, who exists of himself, and is the Fountain of Existence to other Beings, must exist in the *uppermost* and *best* Manner of existing. And (since he

is *infinite* and *illimited*) he must exist in the best Manner *illimitedly* and *infinitely*. Now to exist thus, is infinite Goodness of Existence; and to exist in a Manner *infinitely good*, is to be *perfect*.

VII. *There can be but one such Being.* Because his Manner of Existence being perfect and *illimited*, that Manner of being (if it may be so express'd) is *exhausted* by him, or belongs solely to him. If any other could partake with him in it, he must want what that other had; be *deficient* and *limited*. Infinite and illimited inclose all. [Briefly thus: There cannot be two different infinite, or absolutely perfect Beings. For wherein they were different, one would want somewhat that the other had, which is not to be absolutely perfect.] This is P. 71. sufficient to ruin the *Manichean Cause*, and exclude the *independent Principle of Evil*. For if we cannot account for the Existence of that Evil, which we find by Experience to be in the World, it is but one Instance out of many of our Ignorance. There may be Reasons for it, tho' we do not know them: And some things may be said on this Subject, which deserve our Attention. For as to *moral* Good and Evil, they seem to depend upon our selves. If we do but endeavour the *most* we can, to do what we ought,

P. 72.

we shall not be guilty of *not doing it*. And therefore it is our Fault, and not to be charg'd upon any other Being, if Guilt and *Evil* be introduc'd by our Neglect or Abuse of our own Liberty and Powers. Then as to *Physical Evil*, without it much *Physical Good* would be lost, the one necessarily inferring the other *. And if there is a future State, that which seems wrong *now*, may be rectify'd hereafter. Moreover, if this World be design'd for a *Palæstra*, where Men are to exercise their Faculties and their Virtues, and by that *prepare* themselves for a superior State, (and who can say it is not?) there must be *Difficulties* and *Temptations*, Occasions and Opportunities for this Exercise. Lastly, if there are Evils, of which Men know not the true Origin; yet if they would but seriously reflect upon the many Marks of *Reason*, *Wisdom* and *Goodness* every where to be observ'd in Instances, which they *do* or may understand, they could scarce doubt but the same Things prevail'd in those, which they *do not* understand. But to return,

* For Instance, if there was no such Thing as Poverty, there could be no Riches, or no great Benefit by them. There would scarce be any Arts or Sciences, &c. Notes, p. 71.

VIII. *All other Beings depend upon this one supreme Being for their Existence: For being imperfect and dependent, and there being nothing else but the one perfect and independent Being, upon which they can ultimately depend, upon him they must and do depend.*

IX. *He is therefore the Author of Nature; nor can any Thing be, or be done, but what he either causes (immediately or mediately) or permits. For upon whom depends the Existence of all Beings, upon him also must depend the intrinsic Manner of their Existence, or the Natures of these Beings: And again, upon whom depend their Being and Nature, P. 73: upon him depend the necessary Effects and Consequences of their Being, and being such as they are in themselves. Then, as to the Acts of free Agents, and the Effects of them, he is indeed not the Author of those, because they proceed from Agents, who have no Necessity impos'd upon them by him to act either this or that Way. But yet however these free Agents must depend upon him as such, from him they derive their Power of acting; and it is he, who permits them to use their Liberty: Tho' many Times through their own Fault they use it amiss. And lastly, as to the Nature*

Nature of those *Relations*, which lie between Ideas or Things really *existing*, or which arise from Facts already *done and past*, these result from the Natures of the *Things* themselves; all which the supreme Being either causes or permits (as before).

From hence it now appears, that whatever expresses the Existences or Non-existences of Things, and their mutual Relations *as they are*, is true by the Constitution of Nature: And if so, it must be also agreeable to his Will, who is at the Head of it. And thus those Arguments in Sect. I. Prop. 4. which turn'd only upon a *Supposition* that there was such a Being, are here *confirm'd* and *made absolute*.

P. 73.

X. *The one supreme and perfect Being, upon whom the Existence of all other Beings, and their Powers originally depend, is that Being, whom we mean by the Word GOD.*

P. 74.

XI. *God cannot be corporeal. There are many Things in Matter utterly inconsistent with the Nature of such a Being, as it has been demonstrated God must be. Particularly Matter is incapable of acting, passive only and stupid; which are Defects that can never be ascribed to him who is the first Cause or*
prime

prime Agent, the supreme Intellect, and altogether perfect.

XII. *Neither infinite Space, nor infinite Duration, nor Matter infinitely extended, or eternally existing, nor any, nor all of these taken together, can be God.* For p. 75. each of these by themselves are utterly incapable of divine Perfection. And if the *Universe*, or Sum total of finite Beings, were God, then *every Thing* is Divine, *every Thing* God, or of God: And so *all Things* together must make but one Being. But on the contrary we see, there are many distinct Beings, and separable one from the other, and independent each of other. In short, no *Collection* of Beings, can be *one Being*, and therefore not God; [much less p. 76. can a Collection of imperfect and finite Beings, make up a perfect and infinite one.]

XIII. *It is so far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no such Thing as either Matter or Motion without him.* This must be true of *Matter*, because it has been prov'd already, that there can be *but one* independent Being; that he is *incorporeal*, and that the *Existence* of all other Beings must *depend upon him*. It is to no Purpose to object, that one cannot *conceive* how p. 77. the

the Existence of Matter can be deriv'd from another Being. For God being *above our Conceptions*, the Manner of his Operations, and in which Things depend upon him, must also be to us *inconceivable*. Reason discovers that this visible World must owe it's Existence to some invisible almighty Being; that is, it discovers this to be Fact; and we must not deny Facts, because we know not *how* they are effected. It is far from being new, that our Faculties discover to us the Existence of Things, and then drop us in the Enquiry *how* they are. As for *Motion*, if Matter it's self could not be without such a Cause, it is certain, *Motion*, which is an Affection of Matter, could never be. Besides, there could be no *Motion*, unless either there be in Matter it's self a Power of *beginning* it, or unless it is communicated from Body to Body in an *infinite Succession*, or in a *Circle*, and so has no Beginning; or else is *produc'd* by some incorporeal Being, or Beings. Now as hardy as Men are in advancing Opinions that favour their Vices, though never so repugnant to Reason, it can hardly be believed any one will assert, that a Particle of *mere Matter* (let it be great or small, of any Figure whatsoever, &c.) left altogether to it's self, could ever of it's self *begin* to move. To be short, a

Power

Power of beginning Motion is not in the Idea of Matter: Nor is there any Thing *p. 78.* in all Physicks better settled than that which is called *Vis Inertiæ*, or *Inertia* of Matter.

The Propagation of Motion from Body to Body, *without any first Mover*, or immaterial Cause of Motion, has been proved impossible, Prop. I.

The Supposition of a perpetual Motion in a *Circle*, is begging the Question. For if *A* moves *B*, *B* moves *C*, and so on to *Z*, and then *Z* moves *A*; this is the same as to say, that *A* moves *A*, by the Intervention of *B*, *C*, *D*, --- *Z*: That is, *A* moves *it's self*, or can begin Motion.

It remains then that all corporeal Motions come originally from some Mover *incorporeal*; which must be either that supreme and self-existing *Spirit* himself, who is God; or such as will put us in the Way how to find, that there is such a Being, *vid. p. 65.* Hence there is not *p. 79.* the *least Particle* of Matter, that does not carry with it an Argument of God's Existence; not the slightest Motion produc'd, the least *Whisper* of the Air, but tells it.

XIV. *The Frame and Constitution of the World, the astonishing Magnificence of it, the various Appearances and Kinds of Beings, the Uniformity observ'd in the Productions of Things, the Uses and Ends for which*

P. 80.

which they serve, &c. do all shew that there is some Almighty Designer, an infinite Wisdom and Power at the Top of all these Things: Such Marks there are of both: Or, God is that Being, without whom such a Frame or Constitution of the World, such a Magnificence in it, &c. could not be.

P. 81.

In Order to prove to any one the Grandness of this Fabrick of the World, one needs only to bid him consider the Sun, with that insupportable Glory and Lustre that surrounds it, and in a Word, the Magnificence and immense Expanse of the *Heavens*; in which, if we could take a View of all the *Particulars*, how would Wonders multiply upon us? If we look upon this *our Seat* (the Earth) what Scope is here for Admiration? The great *Variety* of Mountains, Hills, Valleys, Plains, Rivers, Seas, Trees, Plants! The many Tribes of different *Animals*, with which it is stocked! The multifarious *Inventions* and *Works* of one of these; that is, of us *Men*, &c. And yet when all these (Heaven and Earth) are survey'd as *nicely* as they can be by the Help of our unassisted Senses, and even of telescopical Glasses, by the Assistance of good *Microscopes* in very small Parts of Matter, as many new Wonders may perhaps be discovered, as those already observed; new *Kingdoms* of Animals,

mals, new *Architecture* and Curiosity of Work.

And this mighty Building is not only thus grand, and the Appearances stupendous in it, but the *Manner* in which Things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their Causes too *profound* for us. It is impossible for us to come at the true *Principles* of Things, or to see into the *Œconomy* of the *finest* Part of Nature and Workings of the first Springs. The Causes that appear to us are but the *Effects* of other Causes; and as to the *Substances* of Things, and their *internal Constitution*, they are hid P. 82. from our Eyes. Our Philosophy dwells in the Surface of Nature.

However, it appears plainly enough in the Parts and Model of the World, that there is a *Contrivance* and a Respect to certain Reasons and *Ends*. And since P. 83. we cannot suppose the *Parts* of Matter to have *contrived* this wonderful Form of a World among themselves, and then by Agreement to have taken their respective Posts, and pursued constant *Ends* by certain Methods and Measures *concerted* (because these are Acts, of which they are not capable) there must be some other Being, whose Wisdom and Power are equal to such a mighty Work, as is the Structure and Preservation of the World. There must be some
Almighty

Almighty *Mind*, who models and adorns it; lays the Causes of Things so deep; prescribes them such uniform and steddly Laws; destines and adapts them to certain Purposes; and makes one Thing to fit and answer to another. That *such* a beautiful Scheme, *such* a just Arrangement of Things, composed of *innumerable* Parts, and placed as the Offices and Uses and Wants of the several Beings *require*, through such an *immense* Extent, should be the Effect of *Chance* only, is a Conceit so prodigiously absurd, that certainly no one can espouse it heartily, who understands the Meaning of that Word. It seems to be only a Term by which we express our *Ignorance* of the Cause of any Thing; whatever Events or Effects there are, they must proceed from some Agent or Cause, which is either *free* or not *free* (that is, *necessary*). If it be free, it wills what it produces; and therefore that which is produced, is produced with *Design*, not by Chance. If it acts necessarily, the Event must *necessarily* be, and therefore it is not by Accident. For that which is by Accident or Chance only, might not have been; or it is an Accident only that it is. There can be therefore *no such Cause* as Chance. In a Word, he must be little acquainted with the Works of Nature, who is not sensible
how

how delicate and fine they are ; and the *finer* they are, the *grosser* were those of *Epicurus*.

If it should be objected that many Things seem to be *useless*, many Births are *monstrous*, or the like ; such Answers as these may be made. Things have not therefore no Uses, because they are conceal'd from us ; nor is *Nature* irregular, because there are some *seeming* Deviations from the common Rule. If the Case could be *truly* put, it would no Doubt appear, that Nature proceeds as *regularly* when a *Monster* is produced, as when the usual Issue in common Cases. Under these Circumstances the Monster is the *genuine* Issue ; that is, in the same Circumstances there would p. 85: always be the same Kind of Production.

They who content themselves with Words, may ascribe the Formation of the World to *Fate*, or *Nature*, as well as to *Chance*. And yet *Fate* is nothing but a *Series* of Events, consider'd as necessarily following in some certain Order ; which Words declare nothing concerning the *Cause* of that Concatenation of Events, or why it is. Time, Place, Manner, Necessity, are but *Circumstances* of Things that come to pass ; not Causes of their Existence, or of their being as they are ; on the contrary, some external and superior Cause must

E be

be suppos'd to put the *Series* in Motion, to project the Order, to connect the Causes and Effects, and to *impose* the Necessity.

P. 86.

Then for *Nature*. 1. If it be used for the *natural* Constitution, Make, or Disposition of Things, in Opposition to what is *acquir'd*; then to say that *Nature* form'd any Thing, is to say that it form'd it's self, or that the *Effect* is the Efficient. 2. If it be used for the *Ideas* of Things, what they are in themselves, and what in their Circumstances, Causes, Consequences, Respects; (as when we say the *Nature* of Justice requires this or that) then none of these Senses can do an Atheist any Service. 3. If it be us'd for the *World*, then it stands for *that very Thing*, the Architect of which is the Subject of our Enquiry; and therefore cannot be the Architect it's self. 4. If it signifies the *Laws* of the *World*, by which it is govern'd, and the *Phænomena* in it produc'd, then *Laws* suppose some Legislator, and are posterior to that of which they are Laws.

P. 87.

Lastly, if it denotes the *Author of Nature*, or God, then to *him* it is that the Formation of the *World*, &c. is here ascrib'd. To all which let it be subjoin'd, that there is an unaccountable *Liberty* taken in the Use of this Word. And that frequently it is us'd merely as

a *Word*, and nothing more; they who use it not knowing themselves what they mean by it. However, in *no Sense* can it supersede the being of a *Deity*.

XV. *Life, Sense, Cogitation, and the Faculties of our own Minds, shew the Existence of some superior Being, from whom they are deriv'd.* Matter of it's self is not capable of these Powers; and our *Souls* being not self-existent or independent, we must be indebted for them to some great Benefactor, who is the *Fountain* of all our Powers. It is in vain to p. 88. say that the *Soul*, together with *Life, Sense, &c.* are propagated by *Traduction* from Parents to Children, from Eternity: For if such a *Traduction* were possible, yet to suppose this without any farther Account of the Original of Mankind or taking in any Author of this traductive Power, is the same as to suppose an infinite Series of *Effects* without a *Cause*, which has been already shewn to be absurd, Prop. I.

But as to the Opinion it's self of the *Traduction* of Souls, it ought to be clearly explain'd what is meant by *Tradux Animæ*: For it is not easy to conceive how Thought, or thinking Substances can be propagated after the Manner of *Branches*, or in any Manner that can be *analogous* to it, or even warrant a *metaphorical*

phorical Use of that Phrase. It should be also told, whether this Traduction be made from *one* or from *both* the Parents. If from one, from *which* of them is it? And if from both, then the same *Tradux* or Branch must always proceed from two Stocks; which is a Thing that has no Parallel in Nature. And yet it might much better be suppos'd of Vines, or Plants, than of *thinking* Beings, who are simple and uncompounded Substances.

P. 89.

This Opinion therefore of the *Traduction* of Souls stands upon an unsound Foundation. It is chiefly founded on these two Things; the *Similitude* there is between the Features, &c. of Children, and those of their Parents, and the Difficulty Men find in forming the *Notion of a Spirit*. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other Substance but Matter; and that the Soul being some merely material Appendix to the Body, or the like, must *attend* it, and come along with it from the Parent or Parents. Now the former of these is not always true; as it ought to be to make the Argument valid. Besides, it may not be hard to account for *some* Likeness without the Help of Traduction. As to the other Thing, *viz.* That the Soul is merely material, or but the Result of some

P. 90.

Dispo-

Disposition in Matter, it will be refused hereafter. But this may be premised here: Tho' we can have no Image of a Spirit, yet we may have Reason to assert the Existence of *such* a Substance: Because Matter being incapable of Thought, we are under a Necessity of confessing that there is some other Species of Substance, and that our Souls are of that Kind, tho' we can draw no Image of it in our own Minds. Nor is it at all surprizing that we should not, unless the Mind could be the Object of it's self, or as it were the *Object* and *Spectator* both. Only that perfect Being, whose Knowledge is infinite, can thus *intimately* know himself. P. 91.

Lastly, If there is no *Race* of Men that hath been from Eternity, then there is no Man who is not descended from two *first Parents*; and then their Souls could be traduced from *no other*. And there is no such Race from Eternity, is apparent from the Face of earthly Things, and the *History* of Mankind, Arts and Sciences. What is objected against this Argument from *fancied Inundations, Conflagrations, &c.* has no Weight. For no *Conflagration*, no *Blood*, no *Destruction* can serve the Objector's Purpose, to reduce Mankind to that State, which, by ancient Memoirs and many undeniable Symptoms, we find them P. 92.

them to have been in *not many* thousands of Years since: I say, no *Destruction* can serve his Purpose, but such an one as makes *thorough* Work, only sparing two or three Couples, strip of every Thing, and the most stupid and veriest Blocks to be picked out of the whole Number; natural Fools, or mere *Hamines Sylvestres* would retain Habits, and fall to their old Way of living as soon as they had the Opportunity to do it. And suppose they never should have such an Opportunity; yet neither would *this* serve him effectually: Since without some *supernatural* Power interposing, such a Revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked Creatures preserv'd, nor the Earth reform'd out of it's Ashes and Ruins after such a Cal-cination, or Dissolution, such a *total* Demolition of every Thing. Add to this, that tho' many Inundations, great Earthquakes, Vulcano's and fiery Eruptions have been in particular Countries; yet there is no Memory or Testimony of any such Thing, that has been ever *universal*, except perhaps of one Deluge: And as to that, if the *Genius* of the Language in which the Relation is deliver'd, and the Manner of writing History in it were well understood, some labour'd Attempts to account for it might have been prevented. And be-
side

side that, the same *Record*, which tells the Thing was, tells also how immediately God was concern'd in it; that some Persons actually were saved: And that the People who then perish'd, as as well as they who surviv'd, all descended from two *first Parents*: And if that Authority be a sufficient Proof of *one* Part of the Relation, it must be so of the *rest*.

We may conclude then, that the *human Soul*, with it's Faculties of Cogitation, &c. depends upon a *superior Being*. And who can this be, but the *supreme Being*, or God?

XVI. *Tho' God's Essence and Manner of being is to us altogether incomprehensible, yet we may say with Assurance, that he is free from all Defects: As our Minds are finite, they cannot without a Contradiction comprehend what is infinite. How should we comprehend the Nature of the supreme incorporeal Being, or how he exists, when we comprehend not the Nature of the most inferior Spirits, nor have any Conception even of Matter it's self divested of it's Accidents? If we cannot turn our selves any Way, even in this material World, without being accosted with something above our Understanding; how can we see through the Mysteries of his Nature, who is the*

E 4

supreme

supreme *Cause*, so far above every Thing that is here.

P. 94.

However, we may positively affirm, that whatever our own Defects are, there are *none* in God. This needs no Proof, since he is a *perfect* Being, as we have already seen. From him therefore must be remov'd *Want of Life and Activity, Ignorance, Want of Power, acting inconsistently with Reason and Truth*, and the like. And when we speak of the *internal essential Attributes* of God positively, as that he is omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the *Intent* is only to say, that there is no Object of Knowledge or Power, which he does not know, or cannot do; that he exists without Beginning and End, &c. And we may speak *thus* without pretending to *comprehend* his Nature. And so,

XVII. *We may consider God, as operating in the Production and Government of the World, and may draw Conclusions from his Works.* Although we comprehend not the Manner of his Existence, nor the *Mode* or Manner, in which the World depends upon him, and he influences and disposes Things; yet if we see Things, which we know cannot be self-existent, and observe plainly an *Æconomy* and *Design* in the Disposition of them, we may justly conclude there is *some Being*,

Being, upon whom their Existence doth depend, and by whom they are model'd, may call this Being GOD, or the Author and Governor of the World. P. 95.

XVIII. *God, who gives Existence to the World, does also govern it by his Providence.* The World may be said to be so govern'd, if there are *Laws and Provisions*, (which can come originally from no other Being, but from him who is the *Author of Nature*) by which *natural Causes* act, and in general the Constitution of Things is preserv'd, and *particular Cases* relating to *rational Beings* are taken Care of in such a Manner, as will at last best agree with *Reason*. As to a *general Providence* (whereby the Constitution of Things both animate and inanimate is preserv'd) we see, or may see, *in Fact*, that there is *such* a Providence. The *World* not being left in a State of Confusion, or as a Chaos, but reduc'd into *Order*, and *methodiz'd* for Ages to come, the several Species of Beings having their Offices and Provinces assign'd them; Plants and Animals Subsistence set out for them; and as they go off, Successors appointed to relieve them, and carry on the *Scheme*, &c. P. 98.

The great Difficulty is, how to account for that *Providence*, which is called *particular*; or that, which respects (principally)

cipally) *particular* Men. For rational Beings and free Agents are capable of doing and deserving *well*, or *ill*. Hence many and great Differences will arise, which will require from a Governor suitable Encouragements, or the contrary. Now the *good* or *ill* State of a Man here depend upon many Things, which seem to be scarce *all* capable of being determin'd by Providence. They depend upon what he does *himself*, and what naturally follows from his own Behaviour; upon what is done by *others*, and may either touch him at the same Time, or reach him afterward; upon the *Course* of Nature, which must affect him; and, in *fine*, upon many *Incidents*, of which no Account is to be given. Can there then be a particular Providence, a Providence that suits the *several Cases* and Prayers of Individuals, without a continual *Repetition* of *Miracles*, and Force frequently committed upon the Laws of Nature, and the Freedom of intelligent Agents? There may for these Reasons.

p. 99.

I. It seems not *impossible* that God should know *what is to come*: On the contrary, it is highly reasonable to think, that he does and must know Things *future*: Whatever happens in the World, which does not come immediately from him, must either be the effect of *mechanical Causes*, or of the *Motions* of living Beings.

ings and free Agents. As to the former, it cannot be *impossible* for him, upon whom the Being and Nature of every Thing depends to see through the whole *Train* of Causes and Effects, and whatever will come to pass in *that way*; nay, it is *impossible* that he should not P. 100. do it. And as to those Things which depend upon the *voluntary* Motions of free Agents, let us consider what a Sagacity there is in some *Men*, even in respect of the future Actings of Mankind, how much more remarkable this Penetration is in *some Men*, than in *others*. And that if there be any Minds more perfect than the human, (and who can be so conceited of himself as to question this?) they must have it in a still more eminent Degree, *proportionable* to their Natures. In the last Place, let us but allow (as we must) this Power of discerning to be in God *proportionable* to his Nature, and P. 101. then it becomes *infinite*: And then again, the *future* Actions of free Agents are at once all unlocked, and exposed to his View. Besides, since the Difficulty we find in determining, whether *future* Matters of Fact may be known, rises chiefly from this, that we in Reality consider, without minding it, whether they may be known in *our Way* of knowing; it vanishes, when we recollect, that they are and must be known to God by some other

other Way. *Future*, or what to us is future, may be as truly the Object of divine Knowledge, as *present* is of ours: Nor can we tell, what Respect *past, present, to come*, have to the divine Mind, or wherein they differ. In the last Place, this Knowledge is not only not *impossible*, but the Perfection of the Deity necessarily infers, that nothing can be hid from him. For if *Ignorance* be an Imperfection, the Ignorance of *future Acts and Events* must be so. There is indeed a common Prejudice against the *Prescience* (as it is usually called) of God; which suggests, that if God foreknows Things, then they are *certain*, and no longer Matter of *Freedom*: But *sure* the Nature of a Thing is not *chang'd* by being known, or known beforehand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not alter'd by this. The Truth is, God foresees, or rather sees the Actions of free Agents, because they *will be*; not that they will be, because he foresees them.

P. 102.

P. 103.

2. It is not impossible, that such a *Series* of Causes and Effects may be originally design'd, that not only general Provisions may be made for the several Species of Beings, but even *particular Cases*, at least many of them, may be also provided for without *Innovations* in the Course of Nature. It is true, this

this amounts to a prodigious Scheme; but when we consider, what a Mass of *Wonders* the Universe is in other Regards; and what a Being God is, *incomprehensibly* great and perfect, we cannot deny such an *Adjustment* of Things to be within his Power. And in *Fact* particular Men are very commonly (at least in some Measure) rewarded or punished by the *general* Laws and Methods of Nature. The *natural* (tho' not constant) Consequences of Virtue are Peace, Health, and Felicity; of Vice, Loss of Philosophical Pleasures, a diseased Body, Debts and Difficulties. P. 104.

3. It is not *impossible*, that Men, whose Natures and Actions are fore-known, may be introduced into the World in such *Times*, *Places*, and other *Circumstances*, as that their Acts and Behaviour may not only co-incide with the *general* Plan of Things, but also answer many *private* Cases too. And if so, it will follow, that a *particular Providence* may be compatible with the natural Freedom of Men's Actions. Such a Supposition is certainly not beyond the Power of an *almighty, perfect* Being: It is moreover worthy of him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon those Words and take their Import, must believe. The Antients had perhaps some such Thoughts as these; for they were gene- P. 105.

generally *Fatalists*, and yet do not seem to have thought, that they were *not Masters* of their own Actions.

P. 106.

4. It is not *impossible* (for that is all that is here contended for) that many Things suitable to several Cases, may be brought to pass by Means of *secret*, and sometimes *sudden Influences* on our Minds, or the Minds of other Men, whose Acts may affect us. As, if the Case should require, that *N* should be deliver'd from some threatening *Ruin*, or *Misfortune*, which would certainly befall him, if he should go such a Way, at such a Time, as he intended: Upon this Occasion some *new Reasons* may be presented to his Mind, why he should not go *at all*, or not *then*, or not *by that Road*; or he may forget to go. After the same Manner, not only Deliverances from Dangers and Troubles, but Advantages and Successes may be conferr'd. On the other Side, Men may, by way of Punishment for Crimes committed, incur Mischiefs and Calamities. I say, these Things and such like *may be*: And perhaps there are but few of them who have made Observations on themselves and their Affairs, but must, when they reflect on Life past, and the various Adventures and Events in it, find Instances, in which their usual Judgment and Sense of Things cannot but seem

to

to themselves to have been *over-ruled* they knew not *by what*, nor *how*, nor *why*; and that these Actions have had Consequences very *remarkable* in their History. Not to add, that the World has generally acknowledg'd, and therefore seems to have *experienced* some Assistance and Directions given to good Men by the Deity; that Men have been many Times infatuated, and lost to themselves, &c. If any one should object, that if Men are thus over-ruled in their Actings, then they are deprived of their *Liberty*, &c. The Answer is, that tho' Man is a free Agent, he may not be free as to *every Thing*; his Freedom may be restrain'd, and he only accountable for those Acts, in Respect of which he is free. P. 107.

5. There *possibly* may be, and most probably are Beings *invisible*, and *superior* in Nature to us, who may by *other Means* be in many Respects *Ministers* of God's Providence, and Authors under him of many Events to particular Men, without *altering* the Laws of Nature. We have the greatest Reason to think, that such imperfect Beings, as we are, are far below the *Top* of the Scale. Nay, there may be many *Orders* of *superior* Beings, rising in Dignity of Nature, and Amplitude of Power, one above another. And as Men may be so placed as to become, even by the free Exercise P. 108; P. 109.

cise of their own Powers, *Instruments* of God's particular Providence to other Men; so we may well suppose, that these *higher* Beings may be so distributed through the Universe, and subject to such an *Œconomy* (tho' we pretend not to tell what it is) as may render them *also* Instruments of the same Providence; and that they may, in Proportion to their greater Abilities, be capable, *consistently with the Laws of Nature*, some Way or other, tho' not in our Way, of influencing human Affairs in proper Places.

P. 110.

Lastly, It is not pretended that Things must be just in this Manner; there must be *other Ways* above our Understanding, by which such a Being as God is, may take Care of *private Cases*, without interrupting the Order of the Universe. Only let this be added in general, that God cannot put Things so far out of his own Power, as that he should not *for ever govern* Transactions and Events in his own World; nor can *perfect* Knowledge and Power ever want *proper* Means to atchieve what is fit to be done. So that, though what has been advanc'd should stand for nothing, there *may* be a *particular Providence* notwithstanding the forementioned Difficulty. And then, if there *may be* one, it will unavoidably follow, that there is one: Because in
the

the Description of Providence, nothing is supposed with respect to *particular Cases*, but that they should be provided for in such a Manner as will at last best agree with Reason; which therefore may be most certainly depended upon from a *perfect* Being. It is therefore as certain, that there is a *particular Providence*, as that God is a Being of *perfect Reason*. For if Men are treated according to Reason, they must be treated according to what they are; the virtuous, the just, the compassionate, &c. *as such*; and the vicious, unjust, cruel, &c. according to *what they are*. And their several Cases must be taken and consider'd *as they are*; which cannot be done without *such* a Providence.

If it be *objected*, that Things do not seem to be dealt with according to Reason; virtuous and good Men very often labouring under Adversity, Pains, Persecutions, whilst vicious, wicked, cruel Men prevail and flourish: In *answer* to this Charge several Things may be said. Let it here suffice to observe, that if p. 114. what is objected be in many Instances true, this only infers the *Necessity* of a future State. And perhaps it is in Order to convince us of the Certainty of a future State, that Instances of that kind have been so *numerous*.

XIX. *If we would behave our selves as being what we cannot but be sensible we are, towards GOD, as being what he is according to the foregoing Propositions, we must observe these following and the like Particulars.*

1. *We must not pretend to represent him by any Picture or Image whatsoever. Because this is flatly to deny his Incorporeity, incomprehensible Nature, &c.*

P. 115.

2. *We ought to be so far from doing this, that our Thoughts and Words of him ought to be in the most reverent Terms, and most proper Manner we are able; keeping withal this general Conclusion, that, tho' we do the best we can, he is still something above all our Conceptions; and desiring that our faint Expressions may be taken as aiming at a higher and more proportionable Meaning. To do otherwise implies not only, that his Mode of Existence and essential Attributes are comprehensible by us, but also (which is more) that our Words and Phrases, taken from among our selves, and the Objects of our Faculties, are adequate Expressions of them, contrary to Truth.*

P. 116.

For Instance, as God is a pure, uncompounded Being, his Attributes of Mercy, Justice, &c. cannot be as we conceive them, because in him they are one. Perhaps they may more properly

be called together *divine Reason*; which, as it exerts it's self upon this or that Occasion is by us *variously* denominated. When we speak of the *Knowledge* of God, we must not mean, that he knows Things *in the Way that we do*; but rather intend, in general, that there is nothing of which he is, or can be *ignorant*. When *Glory, Honour, Praise* are given to God; or he is said to do any Thing for his own *Glory*, or we to propose the *Glory* of his Name in what we do; those Words should not be taken for *that Kind* of Glory and Applause, which is so industriously fought, and capriciously distributed among us Mortals. To handle this a little more *largely*. Among us some are celebrated for small P. 117. Matters, either through the Ignorance of the Multitude, the Partiality of a Faction, the Advantage of great Friendships, the usual Deference paid to Men in eminent Stations, or mere good Luck: And others for atchieving *such Things*, as, if they were duly weighed and People were not imposed upon by *false Notions*, would appear rather to be a Disgrace to *Savages*, than any Recommendation of rational and *civiliz'd* Natures. Strength, and Courage, and Beauty, and Parts, and Birth, are followed with *Encomiums* and Honours, which, tho' they may be the Felicities and *Privileges*

of the Possessors, cannot be their *Merit*, whilst real *Virtue* and *Industry* (which give the *truest Title* to *Praise*) lie disregarded. Thirst after *Glory*, when that is desired merely for it's own sake, is founded in *Ambition* and *Vanity*; the Thing it's self is but a *Dream*, and *Imagination*. Men please themselves with *Notions* of *Immortality*, and fancy a *Perpetuity* of *Fame* secured to themselves, by *Books* and *Testimonies* of *Historians*. But alas! it is a stupid *Delusion*, when they imagine themselves *present*, and *enjoying* that *Fame* at the reading of their *Story* after their *Death*. And beside, in *Reality* the Man is not known ever the more to *Posterity*, because his *Name* is transmitted to them. When it is said, *Julius Cæsar* beat *Pompey*, &c. it is the same Thing, as to say, the *Conqueror* of *Pompey*, &c. was *Cæsar*. The Amount then is only this; that the *Conqueror* of *Pompey* conquer'd *Pompey*; or some *Body* conquer'd *Pompey*; or rather, since *Pompey* is as little known now as *Cæsar*, some *Body* conquer'd some *Body*. Such a poor *Business* is this boasted *Immortality*! There are, I think, two *Considerations*, which may justify a *Desire* of some *Glory* or *Honour*, and scarce more. When Men have performed any *virtuous Actions*, it is a *reasonable Pleasure* to have the *Testimony* of the

the World added to that of their own Consciences, that they have done well: And more than that, if the *Reputation* acquir'd by any Qualification or Action, may procure a Man any *real* Comfort or Advantage (if it be only Protection from the Insolencies and Injustice of Mankind, or if it enables him to do by his Authority more good to others,) to have this Privilege must be a great Satisfaction, and what a *wise* and *good* Man may be allowed, as he has Opportunity, to propose to himself. But then he proposes it no farther than it may be *useful*; and it can be no farther useful than he *wants* it. So that upon the whole, *Glory*, *Praise*, and the like, are either mere *Vanity*, or only valuable in Proportion to our *Defects* and *Wants*. In Conclusion P. 119. therefore, tho' Men have been accustomed to speak of the *Deity* in Terms taken from earthly *Princes*; and tho' considering what Defects there are in our Ways of thinking and speaking, we cannot well part with them all: Yet we must remember to *exalt* the Sense of them, or annex some *mental* Qualification to the Use of them. As, if God be said to do Things for his own *Glo-*
ry, the Meaning in the Author's Opinion must be, that the transcendent Excellence of his Nature may be collected from the Form of the World, and

Administration of Things in it; where there occur such *Marks* of inexpressible Wisdom and Power, that he needed not to have given us *greater*, had he only intended his own *Glory*, or something to this Purpose. Or if the *Glory* of what *we* do, be ascribed to *him*; by this must be signify'd, that no *Glory* is due to us, who have no Powers, but what originally depend upon him; and that we desire therefore to acknowledge him to be the true Author of all that which is *laudable* in us.

P. 120.

Many more Reflections might be made upon *Epithets* and *Ways of speaking*, introduced by Custom, from rude Antiquity, or by Necessity, following from the Narrowness either of Men's Minds, or their Language *. It is plain, that *Love*, *Anger*, *Hands*, *Eyes*, &c. when ascribed to God, cannot import such

* To speak altogether properly of God, is not in our Power; because, as was before observed, his Manner of Existence and essential Attributes are not comprehensible by us. We must therefore speak of him as well as our finite Capacities will permit, and after the Manner of Men; or after such a Manner as will be suitable to the Understanding and Capacities of the Generality of Mankind. This Manner of speaking therefore of God, is not only not well to be parted with, but rather necessary to be us'd; only Care should be taken, that it be not misunderstood, so as to give Men wrong Notions of him.

bodily Parts or Passions as are found in us.

3. *We shall find our selves bound to worship him, in the best Manner we can. For by worshipping him is here meant nothing but owning him to be what he is, and our selves to be what we are, by some more solemn and proper Act; that is, by addressing our selves as his Dependents to him as the supreme Cause, and Governour of the World, with Acknowledgments of what we enjoy, Petitions for what we really want, or he knows to be convenient for us, and the like. As if we should in some humble and composed Manner pray to that Almighty Being, upon whom depends the Existence of the World, and by whose Providence we have been preserved to this Moment, and enjoyed many undeserved Advantages; that he would graciously accept our grateful Sense and Acknowledgments of all his Beneficence toward us. That he would deliver us from the evil Consequences of all our Transgressions and Follies: That he would endue us* P. 121.
with such Dispositions and Powers, as may carry us innocently and safely through all future Trials, and may enable us upon all Occasions to behave our selves conformably to the Laws of Reason, piously and wisely. That he would suffer no Being to injure us, no Misfortune to befall us, nor us to hurt our selves by any Error or Miscon-

duct of our own: That he would vouchsafe us clear and distinct Perceptions of Things; with so much Health and Prosperity, as may be good for us: That we may at least pass our Time in Peace, with Contentment and Tranquillity of Mind: And that having faithfully discharged our Duty to our Family and Friends, and endeavour'd to improve our selves in virtuous Habits and useful Knowledge, we may at last make a decent and happy Exit, and then find our selves in some better State. Not to do this, or something like it, will certainly fall among those criminal Omissions mention'd, Sect. I. Prop. V. For never to acknowledge the Enjoyments and Privileges we have received and hold of God, is in effect to deny that we receive them from him; not to apply to him for what we want, is to deny either our Wants, or his Power of helping us; and so on, all contrary to Truth.

It must be ever own'd, that no Worship can be proportionable to the divine Nature and Perfections, but yet that we are obliged to do what we can; therefore those Words were added, *in the best Manner we can*. And it must be acknowledged farther, that those Words do not oblige us to be *always* at our Devotions neither. For that is unsuitable to our Nature and Condition;

tion; and, if it could be done, would imply wrong Notions of God himself: Therefore that Limitation was inserted, by *some solemn and proper Act*.

Tho' every Man knows best his own P. 122.
 Opportunities and Circumstance, and therefore may be most able to judge for himself, how he may *best* perform this Duty; yet in general it may be said, that to the doing of it *solemnly*, and in the best Manner we can, these Things are required: An intent *Mind*, proper *Times* and *Places*, a proper *Form* of Words, and a proper *Posture*. For if the *Mind* be absent, it is not the *Man* that prays, it is only as it were the Noise of a Machine, which is put into Motion indeed, but without any Consciousness of it's own Act. Upon this Account it will be certain, that all Times and Places cannot be equally proper. Those of *Retreat* and *Silence* ought to be sought; and for this farther Reason, because the farther we are removed from the Notice of others, the clearer we stand of all *Ostentation*. As to a *Form* of Words, even that *Prayer* which is called *mental*, can scarce be made without Words, or something equivalent. P. 123.
Words seem to be as it were *Bodies* or *Vehicles* to the Sense or Meaning, which is the *spiritual Part*, and which without the other can hardly be fix'd in the
 Mind.

Mind. And since to *think* over a Set of Words cannot be a more adequate Manner of addressing to God, than to *speak* it over and think too: And moreover, since the very *Sound* of the Words affects us, and when the Form is ready prepared, and the being freed from the Labour of composing, doth really help *Attention*; since this is the Case, it must be better, when we have an Opportunity, to *pronounce* a Prayer, than only to *think* it over †. But then it should be spoken no louder (when we pray privately) than just to make it audible to *our selves*. It is not upon God's Account that we speak, since he would know even our Thoughts; but it is upon *our own* Account, and to make our *Adorations*, tho' imperfect at the best, as compleat as we are able (which by the Way is an Answer to them, who object against Prayer, the *Impertinence* of talking to God.) This being premised, and it being found that we must make Use of *Words*, it cannot be denied that we ought to use the *best* and *properest*

P. 124.

† As to these Things, it is I think, proper to remind the Reader of what was said above in general, that every Man knows best his own Opportunities and Circumstances, and therefore may be most able to judge for himself.

we

we can. This cannot be done in *extemporaneous* Effusions; and therefore there must be Forms *premeditated*; the *best* that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worship God to the best of our Capacity. As a Prayer ought to have all the Marks of Seriousness and being in earnest, it ought to be the *plainest*, and at the same Time is perhaps the *hardest* of all Compositions. It ought to take in a general View of what we have *enjoy'd*, what we *want*, what we have *done*, &c. and every Thing ought to be express'd with *Method* *, in Phrases that are *grave* and *pointing*, and with such a *true* Eloquence, as engages all our Attention, and represents our *deepest* Sense, without *Affectation* or *needless Repetitions*. The Author has therefore many Times wonder'd at those Men, who dispute against preconceived Forms of Prayer. They, who talk so much of the Spirit of Prayer, seem to know but little of it.

* *What is here said is rather applicable to publick Prayer. For as to our private Prayer, in respect of the Generality of Mankind, it is perhaps best they should be taught, that it will altogether suffice, if they come to God, with honest and humble Minds, and with Reverence and Devotion offer up the Sense of their Hearts to him, who, in order to know or to grant our Desires, needs not the Eloquence nor the Language of his Creatures.*

As

As to the *Posture*, that is best, which best *expresses* our Humility, Reverence, and Earnestness, and affects us most.

There ought to be also a *Publick Worship* of the Deity. For besides that Men may be consider'd as Members of a *Society*; or the *Society* may be consider'd as *one Body*, and *as such*, are oblig'd to worship the Deity, and to offer one common Prayer; besides the Need that those, who know not of themselves *how* to pray, or cannot read, have of some Time and Place *appointed*, where they may have suitable Prayers read to them, and be guided in their Devotions: Besides these Things, I say, toward the keeping Mankind in Order, it is *necessary* there should be some Religion profess'd, and even establish'd; which cannot be, without some publick Worship. And were it not for that Sense of Virtue, which is *principally* preserv'd by national *Forms* and *Habits* of Religion, Men would soon lose it *all*, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of Savages do.


P. 126.

4. And lastly, *Rational Beings* should consider in earnest what a mighty Being he is, who by the Constitution of their Nature has laid them under an Obligation of being govern'd by their Reason, and whose Laws the Dictates of right Reason may be said to be. They ought to keep it well
I
impress

imprest upon their Minds, that he is the Being upon whom their *Existence* depends: That it is he who superintends and administers the Affairs of the World by his *Providence*; that the Effects of his *Power* and *Influence* are visible round about them, in all the *Phænomena* of Nature, not one of which could be without him; that they are always in his *Presence*; that he is a Being of *perfect Reason*: That if it be *reasonable* that the Transgressors of *Reason* should be punish'd, they will most certainly *one Time or other*, be punish'd, &c. And then, if they do this, it is easy to see what Effect it must have upon all their *Thoughts*, *Words* † and *Actions*.

By what is said here, no *Superstition* is intended to be introduc'd: It is only the Practice of *Reason* and *Truth*, which is requir'd: And any thing that is *not inconsistent with them*, may be freely done, tho' under the Inspection of our great Lawgiver himself.

† Particularly with Respect to customary Swearing; which beside the ill Consequences it has in making Oaths cheap, &c. is a great Instance of Disregard and Irreverence. For they who use themselves to it, do, at least, make the venerable Name of God to serve for an expletive only; and commonly to rude, passionate, or debauched Discourse. Notes, p. 126.



SECT. VI.

Truths respecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human Laws.

P. 127.

I. **E**Very Man hath in himself a Principle of Individuation, which distinguishes and separates him from all other Men, in such a Manner as may render him and them capable of distinct Properties in Things: That is, B and C are so distinguish'd, that if there be any Thing which B can call his, it will be for that Reason not C's; and what is C's, will for that Reason not be B's.

P. 128.

II. There are some Things, to which (at least before the Case is alter'd by voluntary Subjection, or the like) every individual Man has, or may have, such a natural and immediate Relation, that he only of all Mankind can call them his. Such are his Life, Limbs, Labour, the Effect or Produce of his Labour; and lastly, such Things as a Man may truly call his in some

some such Sense, or upon some such Account, as *no other* can.

III. *Whatever is inconsistent with the general Peace and Welfare (or Good) of Mankind, is inconsistent with the Laws of human Nature, wrong, intolerable.* Those Maxims or Principles, which promote the general *Tranquillity* and *Well-being* of Mankind; if those Words express the *Happiness* of Mankind, must be the *true* Laws of Humanity; and all such Practices as interfere with the one, must also interfere with the other. Because *Happiness* is the End of Society and Laws; which is true, when applied not only to a *particular* Society, but the *universal* Society of Mankind. It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a *general* Law of *human* Nature, which tends only to favour the Pleasures of *some Particulars*, to the Prejudice of the rest. And the *Transgression* of these Laws is *wrong*, and *morally Evil*; because the *P. 129.* general Welfare of a *rational Nature*, and the Laws which advance it, must be founded on *Reason*, nor can be oppos'd by any Thing, but what is opposite to *Reason*, and consequently to *Truth*.

IV. *Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C, would be*

*be just the same in C with respect to B, if the Case was inverted *. Hence it follows, that a good Way to know what is right or wrong, in relation to other Men, is to consider what we should take Things to be were we in their Circumstances.*

P. 130.

V. *In a State of Nature Men are equal in Respect of Dominion.* The Case of *Parents* and their *Children* is here for the present excepted; and those only are consider'd between whom there is no Family-relation, or all Family-relation vanished. In a State, where no *Laws* of Society made any Distinction, *Men* can only be consider'd as *Men*, and as such *B* is the same to *C*, that *C* is to *B*. And therefore *B* has no more Dominion over *C*, than *C* has over *B*; that is, they are in this Regard *equals*.

P. 131.

VI. *No Man can have a Right to begin to interrupt the Happiness of another:* (That is, to invade the Rights of another who has given him no Cause so to do.) For this supposes a Dominion over him, and is manifestly *unreasonable*.

* *This is the Reason of that golden Rule, to do to others, as we would be done by.*

VII. *Yet*

VII. Yet every Man has a Right to defend himself and his against Violence, to recover what is taken by Force from him, and even to make Reprisals, by all the Means that Truth and Prudence permit. For if a Man has no Right to defend himself and what is his, he can have no Right to any Thing; since that cannot be his Right, which he may not maintain to be his Right. And since every Man is oblig'd to consult his own Happiness, he not only may, but even ought to defend it in such a Manner, as does not interfere with Truth, or his own Design of being happy. He ought indeed not to act rashly, or do more than the End propos'd requires. P. 132.

By the same Means that a Man may defend what is his, he may certainly endeavour to recover what has been by any Kind of Violence taken from him. For the Right of it still continues to be his, and he may use it as his accordingly. P. 133.

A Man must also have a Right to the Value of what is forceably taken away from him. For the Thing is to him what it is in Value to him: And the Right he has in it, may be consider'd as a Right to a Thing of such a Value.

P. 134.

VIII. *The first Possession of a Thing gives the Possessor a greater Right to it, than any other Man has, till he and all that claim under him are extinct. For, till then, no other Man can be the first Possessor again, which is more than nothing; since he comes into it by God's Providence, and as it were Donation; and no Man can expel another out of his Possession, without beginning to interrupt his Happiness, contrary to Prop. VI. Note, the Successors of an Invader, got into Possession wrongfully, may acquire a Right in Time, by the Failure of such as might claim under him who had Right. For he, who happens to be in Possession, when all these are extinct, is in the Place of a prime Occupant.*

P. 135.

IX. *A Title to many Things may be transferr'd by Compact or Donation. This depends upon every one's Right of disposing what is his own, as he thinks best; which is but using it as his own.*

P. 136.

X. *There is then such a Thing as Property, founded in Nature and Truth, by Prop. II, VIII, IX.*

XI. *Those Things which only one Man can truly and properly call his, must remain his till he agrees to part with them (if they*

they are such as he may part with) by Compact or Donation; or till they fail, or Death extinguishes him and his Title together, and he delivers the Lamp to his next Man. For,

XII. *To have the Property of any Thing, and to have the sole Right of using and disposing of it, are the same Thing.*

XIII. *He who uses or disposes of any Thing, does by that declare it to be his.* P. 137.

XIV. *To usurp or invade the Property of another Man is Injustice. The contrary, to render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is Justice.*

XV. *All Injustice is wrong and evil; as being plainly contrary to Truth and Reason. The very attempting any Instance of Injustice, or assisting others in such an Attempt, and even the Desire of obtaining any Thing unjustly, must be by the Terms wrong and evil: It being to desire, attempt, or assist in doing that which is evil.* P. 138.

Let it be here observ'd concerning Covetousness; that there seem to be three Sorts of it. One is a Desire of getting from others, tho' unjustly: This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immense, unreasonable, and insatiable Desire of
G 2 heaping

heaping up all one can by just Methods: This also intrenches upon Truth. But to *covet* to obtain what is another Man's by *just Means*, and with his Consent, when it may contribute to the Happiness of our selves, or Families, and perhaps of the other Person too, has nothing surely blameable in it [unless the Word *covet* may seem to express a greater Eagerness of Desire, than is fit to be plac'd on any thing here.]

P. 139.

XVI. *When a Man cares not what Sufferings he causes to others, and especially if he delights in other Mens Sufferings, this is Cruelty. And not to be affected with the Sufferings of other People, tho' they proceed not from us, but from others, or from Causes in which we are not concern'd, is Unmercifulness. Mercy and Humanity are the Reverse of these.*

P. 140.

XVII. *He, who religiously regards Truth and Nature, will not only not be unjust, but (more) not unmerciful, and much less cruel. There is something in human Nature resulting from our very Make and Constitution, which disposes us to Compassion. It is therefore according to Nature to be affected with the Sufferings of other People; and the contrary is inhuman and unnatural. Such also are the Circumstances of Mankind, that it is for the*

the common Good and Welfare of the Majority at least of Mankind, that they should *compassionate* and *help* each other. To do the contrary must therefore be contrary to Nature, and *wrong*, by Prop. III. And every one certainly would think it reasonable to receive Compassion and Help in Distress in *his own Case*, and it must be equally reasonable for him to *compassionate* and *help* others in *theirs*, Prop. IV.

If Unmercifulness, as before defin'd, be wrong, no Time need be spent in proving that *Cruelty* is so.

XVIII. *The Practice of Justice and Mercy is just as Right, as Injustice, Unmercifulness and Cruelty are wrong.* P. 141. This follows from the Nature of Contraries.

XIX. *From the foregoing Propositions may be deduc'd the Heinousness of all such Crimes as Murder, or even the hurting the Person of another any how, when our own necessary Defence does not require it, (it being not possible, that any Thing should be more his, than his own Person, Life and Limbs;) robbing, stealing, cheating, betraying; Defamation, Detraction; defiling the Bed of another Man, &c. with all the Approaches and Tendencies towards them.* For these are not only compriz'd within the Definition of Injustice; but

commonly, and some of them always, come within the Description of Cruelty too.

P. 142.

Particularly in the Case of *Adultery*; the Adulterer denies the *Property* a Husband has in his Wife by Compact, the most express and sacred that can possibly be made; he does that which tends to subvert the Peace of Families, confounds Relation, and is altogether inconsistent with the *Order and Tranquillity* of the World, and therefore with the Laws of human Nature: He does what no Man in his Wits could think *reasonable*, or even *tolerable*, were he the Person wrong'd. Briefly, he impudently treats a Woman *as his own Woman* (or Wife) who is *not his*, but *another's*, contrary to *Justice, Truth and Fact*. Nor is this Injustice only, but Injustice heighten'd with several Aggravations. Nor may this Crime be excus'd from it's Secrecy. For the Injustice of the Fact *is the same in it's self*, whether known or not. And since no *Retreat* can be impervious to his Eye (who is the Author of Nature) no doubt there is to every wrong and *vicious Act*, a suitable Degree of Unhappiness and *Punishment* annex'd, which the Criminal will be sure to meet with *some Time or other*.

P. 143.

It will be easily perceiv'd that all those Things which have any *Tendency* towards

towards any of those Crimes aforementioned, or *Affinity* with them, or any Way *countenance* them, must be in their Degree criminal. Hence *Envy*, *Malice*, *Calumny* and *Detraction*, many *Freedom*s and reputed *Civilities* of barbarian Extract, and especially *Gallantries*, sowing the *Seeds* of *Discords* and *Quarrels* by *Stories* or *Insinuations*, and even *intermeddling* in other People's Affairs, are all criminal. How guilty then must they be, who are designedly the *Promoters* or *Instruments* of *Injustice* and *Wickedness*, such as mercenary *Swearers* and false *Witnesses*, *Traders* in *Scandal*, *Solicitors* in *Vice*, they who intend by their *Conversation* to relax Men's Principles too much, and (as it seems) prepare them for *Knavery*, *Lewdness*, or any flagitious *Enterprize*?

There are other Crimes, such as *Infidelity* to Friends, or them who intrust us with any Thing; *Ingratitude*, all kinds of wilful *Perjury*, and the like; which might have been mention'd in the Proposition, being great Instances of *Injustice*: But because they are *visibly* such, they are compriz'd in the &c. there.



SECT. VII.

Truths respecting particular Societies of Men, or Governments.

P. 145.

I. **M**AN is a social Creature; that is, a single Man or Family, cannot subsist, or not well, alone out of Society. The Condition and Circumstances of human Nature shew this; and Society is what Men generally desire. And tho' much Company may be attended with much Vanity, and occasion many Evils, yet absolute and perpetual Solitude has something in it very irksome and hideous. Thus the social Life is natural to Man.

P. 147.

II. *The End of Society is the common Welfare and Good of the People associated.* For because Men cannot subsist well, or not so well, separately, therefore they unite into greater Bodies.

III. A

III. *A Society into which Men enter for this End, supposes some Rules or Laws, according to which they agree all to be govern'd, with a Power of altering or adding to them as Occasion shall require. For a Number of Men met together without any Rules, can be nothing but an irregular Multitude, where Confusion and Unhappiness must prevail. And as the publick Good is to be consider'd at one Time as much as at another, the Power of making new Laws, and of altering or repealing old ones, must always subsist.* P. 148.

IV. *These Laws and Determinations must be such, as are not inconsistent with natural Justice. For to establish Injustice, is to oppose the Laws of our Creator, and the general Good and Happiness of Men.* P. 149.

V. *A Society limited by Laws, supposes Magistrates, and a Subordination of Powers; that is, it supposes a Government of some Form or other. Considering the Nature and Circumstances of Men, an Army may be as well supposed to be well disciplin'd, well provided, and well conducted, without either General or Officers, as a Society without Governors, or their subordinate Magistrates, or (which is the same) without* P. 150.

out *some Form* of Government, to answer the End of it's being.

VI. *A Man may part with some of his natural Rights, and put himself under the Government of Laws and Magistrates, in Order to gain the Protection of them, and the Privileges of a regular Society.* Because by this he doth but exchange one Thing for another, which he reckons *equivalent*, or indeed *preferable* by much.

If it be ask'd, *what natural Rights* a Man may part with, or *how far* he may part with them, the *general Answer* may be this. Some Things are *essential* to our being, and some *it is not in our Power* to part with. As to the *rest*, he may depart from them so far as it is consistent with the *End* for which he does this; not farther, because beyond that lies a Contradiction.

P. 151.

VII. *Men may become Members of a Society by giving their Consent, either explicitly, or implicitly.* That a Man may subject himself to Laws, we have seen. If he does this, he must do it either in *his own Person*, or he must do it by some *Proxy*; or his Consent must be *collected* only from the Conformity of his Carriage, his adhering to the Society, accepting the Benefits of it's Constitution,

tion, and acquiescing in the establish'd Methods, and what is done by Virtue of them. By the *two first Ways* he declares himself *explicitely* and *directly*; by the last his Consent is given indeed *implicitly*, and less directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a Party.

VIII. *When a Man is become a Member of a Society, if he would behave himself according to Truth, he ought to behave himself according to his Subordination or Place in the Community, and to observe the Laws of it.* P. 152.

IX. *In respect of those Things, which the Laws of the Place take no Cognizance of, or if they do, when the Benefit of them cannot be had (as it may sometimes happen) he who is a Member of the Society in other Respects, retains his natural Liberty, and must endeavour to act according to Truth, and his best Prudence. For in the former Case there is nothing to limit him, by the Supposition, but Truth and Nature. And in the other it is the same, as if it were nothing; since in Effect there is no Law, where no Effect or Benefit from it is to be had: As for Example, if a Man should be attack'd by Thieves or Murderers, and has no Opportunity or Power to call the proper Magistrate to his Assistance. There is*

P. 153.

is a *third* Case; and that is, when Laws are plainly contrary to *Truth* and *natural Justice*. In this Case *both* cannot oblige, and it is easy to discern *which* ought to give way.

X. *Kingdoms and Commonwealths* may defend themselves against other Nations, or, War may lawfully be wag'd in Defence and for the Security of a Society, it's Members and Territories, or for Reparation of Injuries. For if *one* Man may in a State of Nature have a Right to defend himself (see Sect. VI. Prop. VII.) *two* may, or *three*, and so on. And if this may be done by Men in a State of Nature, it may be done by them, when confederated among themselves: Because with Respect to other Nations, they are still in *that* State, so far as they have not limited themselves by *Leagues* and *Alliances*. And perhaps by this Rule, regard being had to what has been deliver'd in Sect. VI. the *Justice* of foreign Wars may be not untruly estimated.

Mutual Defence is one of the great Ends of Society, if not the greatest, and in a particular and eminent Manner involves in it Defence against *foreign Enemies*. And he, who signalizes himself in a proper Manner, when there is Occasion for his Service, merits the grateful Acknowledgments and Celebrations

tions of his Countrymen. But as to those *Wars* which are undertaken by Men out of Ambition, these are founded upon false Notions of Glory, and condemn'd by all true Philosophy and Religion.



SECT. VIII.

Truths concerning Families and Relations.

THIS Section begins, as Relation it's self does, with *Marriage*.

I. *The End of Marriage is the Propagation of Mankind, and joint Happiness of the Couple intermarrying; or the latter by it's self.* As to the latter, no Body can be suppos'd to marry without a Presumption of some Degree of Happiness to accrue; and tho' the *Bridegroom* and *Bride* themselves should have not, yet Nature (or rather it's great Author) has a farther Aim, the Preservation of the Kind. p. 155.

II. *Marriages are made by some solemn Contract, Vow, or Oath, (and these perhaps attended with some Pledge or nuptial Rites) by which the Parties mutually engage*

P. 157.

gage to live together in Love, and to be faithful, assisting, and the like, each to other, in all Circumstances of Health and Fortune, till Death parts them. There is no coming together after the Manner of Man and Wife upon any other Foot; that is, something must pass between them, that is declarative of their Intentions, expresses their Vows, and binds them each to the other.

III. That intimate Union by which the married Couple become possess'd each of the other's Person; the Mixture of their Fortunes, and the joint Relation they have to their Children, all strengthen the Bonds and Obligations of Matrimony.

P. 158.

IV. Marrying, when there is little or no Prospect of true Happiness, and especially if there are plain Presages of Unhappiness; after Marriage, Adultery; all Kinds of Infidelity; transferring that Affection, which even under the Decays of Nature ought to preserve it's Vigour, and never to degenerate (at worst) but into a Friendship of a superior Kind, and the like, are all wrong. The first of these is to act as if that was the least and most trifling of all Transactions in Life, which is certainly one of the greatest and most delicate. And a Misbehaviour in any of the other Ways, being repugnant to Truth, is a

Sin against it, and the mighty Patron of it. And if such sacred Compacts as those of Marriage are allow'd to be broken, there is an End of all Faith.

The *Man* and *Woman* being thus consider'd among themselves, it is now proper in the Order of Nature to consider them as *Parents*. P. 159.

V. *Parents ought to educate their Children, take the best Care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to assist them.* Not to do this, is to transgress the *Law* establish'd by Nature for the Preservation of the Race, which, as Things are, could not without a parental Care and Affection be continued; a *Law*, which is in Force among all the other Tribes of *Animals*, so far as there is Occasion for it: And not only so, but it is also a heinous Instance of *Cruelty*. And not only the *Care*, but the *early Care* of Parents is required, lest Death should prevent them. P. 160.

VI. *In Order to the Good of Children, their Education, &c. there must be some Authority over them lodg'd by Nature in the Parents.* The Nature of *Infancy*, *Childhood* and *Youth* shew this; and moreover, the *Fortunes* of Children, and their Manner of setting out in the World depending P. 161.

P. 162.

pending (commonly) upon their Parents, they must upon this Account be their *Directors*, and govern their Affairs.

But *parental Authority* is a very different Thing from a *Dominion* over their Children. It only respects the *Good* of the Children, and reaches not beyond the Means, which the *Parents*, acting according to the best of their Skill, Abilities and Opportunities, find most conducive to *that End*. And therefore they, who found *Monarchy* in paternal Authority, gain little Advantage with Respect to *despotick* or *absolute Power*. A Power to be exercis'd for the *Good* of Subjects (like that of *Parents* for the *Good* of their Children) can only be deriv'd from hence. Beside, if a Parent hath Authority over his Children, it doth not follow, that the *eldest Son* should have the same Authority, be it what it will, over his *Brothers* and *Sisters*: And much less that the *Heir* of the *first Parent* should in succeeding Generations have it over all the *Collaterals*. The very *Relation* between them soon vanishes, and comes at last in Effect to nothing, and this *Notion* with it.

P. 163.

VII. *As Parents are oblig'd to educate their Children, &c. so Children ought to consider*

consider Parents as the immediate Authors
(Authors under the first and great Cause)
of their being.

VIII. A great Submission, and many
grateful Acknowledgments, much Respect
and Piety are due from Children to their
Parents. For the Authority in Parents
demands a proportionable Submission on
the other Side; since an Authority, to
which no Obedience is due, is equal to
none. And to disobey or disregard
them, is to forget they have been the
Instruments of our being, and what
Pains, what Trouble, how many Frights
and Cares, what Charges, and what Self-
denials Parents undergo upon the Score
of their Children.

God, as the first Cause of all Beings,
is, in a large Sense of the Word, the
Father of us all, and if we behave our
selves towards him as *being such*, we
cannot but *adore* him (according to
Sect. V. Prop. IX.) Something *analo-*
gous, tho' in a low Degree, to the Case
between God and his Off-spring, there
seems to be in the Case between Parents
and their Children. If that requires *di-*
vine Worship, this will demand a great
Respect and Reverence. And a Child P. 164.
who doth not honour his Parent, is not
likely to worship his Creator; that Pre-
cept

cept of *honouring Parents*, to be found in almost all Nations and Religions, seems to proceed from some such Sentiment: For in Books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of *worshipping the Deity*.


P. 165.

IX. *That copyn or Affection on both Sides, which naturally and regularly is in Parents towards their Children, and in Children towards their Parents, ought to be observ'd and follow'd, when there is no Reason to the contrary.* For this ought to be taken as a Suggestion of Nature, which should always be regarded, when it is not superseded by something superior, that is, by Reason. And farther, as this natural Affection is design'd for a reasonable End, not to act according to it, is not to act according to Reason.

P. 167.

X. *The same is true of that Affection, which other Relations naturally have, in some Proportion or other, each for other.* In general this may be taken as evident, that next after our Parents and our own Offspring, Nature directs us to be helpful in the first place to Brothers and Sisters, and then to other Relations, according to their respective Distances in the Genealogy of the Family, preferably to all Foreigners. But many Circumstances

stances and Incidents in Life may affect this *Obligation*, and alter the Degrees of it.



SECT. IX.

Truths belonging to a private Man, and respecting (directly) only himself.

I. **H**E that well examines himself, will P. 168.
find not only that he is a rational Animal, but that he is conscious of a Liberty to act or not to act; and therefore that he is such a Being, whose Acts may be morally good or evil; that there are in him many Inclinations and Aversions, which prompt him to act this Way or that Way, that he has great Defects and Limitations in the Use of his rational Faculties and Powers of Action, upon many Occasions; as also that his Passions are many times apt to take wrong Turns, to grow warm, P. 169.
irregular, excessive: In other Words, that he is in many Respects fallible and infirm. And lastly, that he desires to be happy; as every Thing must, that understands what is meant by it.

H 2

II. If

II. If then he will act as he ought to do (that is, agreeably to Truth and Fact) he must do such Things as these.

- P. 170. I. He must subject his sensual Inclinations, his bodily Passions, to Reason; and try every Thing by it. For the great Law impos'd upon him is to be govern'd by Reason, (Sect. III. Prop. XI.) And he who pursues only sensual Objects, and leaves himself to the Impulses of Appetite and Passion, metamorphoses himself into a *Brute*; and when moreover he makes his rational Powers to serve the brutish Part, to assist and promote it, he heightens and increases the *Brutality*, and becomes a *Monster*.
- P. 171. His Duty then is to see that he complies with no *corporeal* Inclinations at the Expence of his Reason; but that all his Passions be directed towards such Objects, and in such Measure, Time and Place as that allows. Every Word and Action should be conducted by Reason. This is the Foundation, and indeed the Sum of all Virtue *.

* This certainly excludes all that Talk, which familiarizes Vice, takes off those Restraints which Men have from Nature or a modest Education, and is so utterly destructive of Virtue, that Aristotle banishes it out of the Commonwealth. Notes, p. 171.

2. *He must take Care not to bring upon himself Want, Diseases, Trouble; but on the contrary endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable Subsistence, as far as he can, without contradicting any Truth: (That is, without doing any Thing he ought not to do.)*

This Limitation is necessary to be observ'd; but otherwise not to consult one's own Safety, Support, and reasonable Satisfaction, and especially to take a Counter-course, and expose himself, is to forget the Condition and Circumstances of his Nature. *Those Evils* which it is not in a Man's Power to prevent, he must endeavour to bear *patiently and decently*: And in Order to this, it is good to be prepar'd for all Attacks, especially the *last, great one*. P. 172.

3. *He must consider even bodily and sensual Affections, Passions, and Inclinations as Intimations, which, many times, he not only may, but ought to hearken to.* For P. 173. what should hinder, when there is no Reason against them, but that the *inferior Springs* should retain their Nature, and act. And our Passions, when they observe their due *Subordination* to Reason, (when they proceed not from unjustifiable Causes, or terminate in wrong Objects, or are unseasonable and immoderate, *vid. p. 172. sub fine*) are of admirable Use in Life, and tend *many Times*

P. 174.

to noble Ends. But they are so very apt to grow upon us, and to become *exorbitant*, that Care must be taken that they be kept under the Command of

P. 175.

Reason. Yet the Gratification of our Appetites, when *Truth* and *Reason* allow, seems to be the *very Means*, by which the Author of Nature intended to *sweeten* the Journey of Life: And a Man may upon the Road as well muffle himself up against Sunshine and blue Sky, and expose himself bare to Rains, and Storms, and Cold, as debar himself of the *innocent Delights* of his Nature for affected Melancholy, Want and Pain. Yet,

4. *He must use what Means he can to cure his own Defects, or at least to prevent the Effects of them; learn to deny Temptations, or keep them at a proper Distance; even mortify, where Mortification is necessary; and always carry about him the Sense of his being but a Man.* He who doth not do this, doth not conform himself to the *Condition* of his *Nature*. And tho' the Advice here given, to *deny one's self* or *Inclinations* in Things in themselves *lawful* and not unreasonable, may seem to infer a Contradiction to what has been just before said; yet when we deny our Inclinations, in order to better our Natures, or prevent Crimes; tho' to follow those Inclinations

tions might *otherwise* be right, in *these Circumstances*, and under this View there arises a good Reason against it, and they accordingly must therefore give Way, which is all that is intended. The last Clause of the Proposition will oblige Men not to be proud, conceited, vain; but modest, and humble, and rather diffident of themselves: Not to censure the Failings of others too hardly, not to be over-severe in punishing or exacting Justice, and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, placable, mansuete, and so forth. P. 176.

5. *He ought to examine his own Actions and Conduct, and where he finds he has transgress'd, to repent.* That is, if the Transgression be against his Neighbour, and the Nature of it admits, to make *Reparation*, or at least as far as he can: In other Cases, when that which is done cannot be *recall'd*, or *repair'd*, or terminates in *himself* only; to live however in a Sense of his Fault, and to prove by such Acts as are proper, that he desires *Forgiveness*, and heartily wishes it undone; which is as it were an *Essay* towards the *undoing* of it, and all that now can be; and lastly, to use all possible Care not to *relapse*. All this is involv'd in the *Idea* of a Fault or Action that is wrong, as it presents it's self to a rational Mind.

P. 177. 6. *He must labour to improve his rational Faculties by such Means, as are (fairly) practicable by him, and consistent with his Circumstances.* No Man indeed is oblig'd beyond his Abilities and Opportunities, (by Sect. IV. Prop. II.) but every Man may, in *some Degree* or other, endeavour to cultivate his Nature, and possess himself of useful Truths. And not to do this, is to cast off *Reason*, apostatize from Humanity, and recoil into the bestial Life.

P. 178. 7. *He must attend to Instruction, and even ask Advice, especially in Matters of Consequence.* Not to do this, is to deny that his Faculties are limited and defective, or that he is fallible, and perhaps that it is possible for another to know what he does not. It is not meant, that a Man ought *implicitly* and *blindly* to follow the Opinion of another, unless he has in himself a good Reason so to do, which many Times happens; but by the Assistance of another, and hearing what he has to say, to find out more certainly, on which Side *Reason, Truth* and *Happiness* (which always keep close together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a Man's own Reason at last, which governs.

P. 179. Lastly, *He must labour to clear his Mind of those Preoccupations and Incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder him*

him from reasoning freely, and judging impartially. For he who would use his rational Faculties, must in the first Place disentangle them, and render them *fit* to be us'd: And he who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not *intend* to use them; that is, he proclaims himself *irrational*.

The Sum of all is this: It is the Duty of every *Man*, to behave himself in all Respects, as far as he is able, according to Reason. And from hence it will follow farther, that

III. *Every Man is oblig'd to live virtuously and piously:* Because to practice *Reason* and *Truth*, is to live after that Manner. That we are oblig'd to behave our selves *reverently* and *dutifully* towards that almighty Being, on whom we depend; and with *Justice*, and a tender Regard to the Properties of other Men, we have already seen. And as to those Virtues, which respect a *Man's self*, our Obligation also thereto will be as apparent, when we are told what is meant by some of the *principal* ones.

Prudence, the Queen of Virtues, is nothing but chusing (after Things have been duly weigh'd) and using the most reasonable Means to obtain some End, that

that is reasonable. This is therefore *directly* the Exercise of Reason.

p. 180.

Temperance permits us all the reasonable Use of Meat and Drink, and only confines us to such *Kinds, Quantities* and *Seasons*, as may best consist with our Health, the Use of our Faculties, our Fortune, &c.

Chastity does not pretend to *extinguish* our tender Passions, but only bids us not indulge them against *Reason* and *Truth*, to divert our Inclinations by Business, or some honest Amusement, till we can gratify them *lawfully, conveniently, regularly*; and even then to participate of the Mysteries of Love with *Modesty*, as within a Veil or sacred Inclosure, not with a canine Impudence.

Frugality indeed not only cuts off all *Profusion* and *Extravagance*, but even deducts something from that, which according to the present Appearance might be *afforded*; but it is, because the Uncertainty of human Affairs makes it proper to do so. And it forbids no Instance of *Generosity*, or even *Magnificence*, which is agreeable to the Man's Station and Circumstances, or (which is tantamount) to the *Truth* of his Case.

p. 181.

Since then to live *virtuously* is to practise *Reason*, and act conformably to *Truth*, he who lives so must be *ultimately happy*, by Sect. II. Prop. XIV. And therefore

therefore not only the Commands of Reason, but even the Desire of Happiness will oblige a Man to live so. It may be collected even from *Experience*, that the *virtuous Life* compar'd with the *contrary*, if one looks no farther than the present State, is the *happier Life*. Who sees not that the *virtuous Life* is full of Dangers and Solitudes, and usually ends ill? Perhaps in Rottenness and Rags, or at least in a peevish and despicable Discontent. However, *Virtue* will p. 182. make a Man happy *hereafter* in some other State, whatever his Lot may be *here*: For *ultimately*, all taken together, happy he *must be*.

To say somewhat in the Close of *Fortitude*. If it be taken for natural Courage, this is Constitution and the Gift of God, not any Virtue in us; to *use it rightly* is. But *Fortitude* consider'd as a p. 183. *Virtue*, consists in standing and endeavouring to overcome Dangers and Oppositions, when they cannot be avoided without the Violation of *Reason* and *Truth*. If a Man can *prevent* or *escape* any Peril or Trouble, without Guilt, he ought to do it. But where that cannot be done, he must exert himself according to his *Abilities*, whether *great* or *little*, and refer the Success to divine Providence. This is the true *Virtue* of *Fortitude*, which is nothing but *endeavouring* firmly

and honestly to act as *Truth* [or our Duty] *requires*. It has for it's *Object* not only bold Undertakings, but in general all the *Evils of Life*, which a Man must labour by Prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done, to bear with Resignation, Decency, and an humble Expectation of an Adjustment of all Events in a *future State*: The Belief of which is in the Sequel shewn to be no vain or groundless Conceit.

IV. *Every one finds in himself a Consciousness of his own Existence and Acts, (which is Life) with a Power of apprehending, thinking, reasoning, willing, beginning and stopping many Kinds and Degrees of Motion in his own Members, &c.*

P. 184.

V. *That which in Man is the Subject or Suppositum of Self-consciousness, thinks and has the aforesaid Faculties (of the Soul) must be something different from his Body or Carcass. He doth not find himself to think, see, hear, &c. all over in any Part of his Body; but the Seat of Cogitation and Reflexion he finds in his Head. It is plainly something which resides there, that by the Mediation of the Nerves governs the Body, sees through the Eyes, &c. Again, as a Man peruses and considers his own Body, doth it not undeniably appear to be something*

P. 185.

something different from the *Considerer*?
And it is plain there are two *different* p. 186.
Interests in Men, those of *Passion* and
Reason: Which being many Times di-
rectly *opposite*, must belong to *different*
Subjects. And as we perceive *something*
within us, which is (or should be) the
Governour of the Body, it must upon
this Account be concluded to be *diffe-*
rent from it.

VI. *The Soul cannot be mere Matter.*
For if it is, then either *all Matter* must
think, or the Difference must arise from
the different *Modification, Magnitude,*
Figure, or Motion of some Parcels of
Matter in Respect of others, or a Fa-
culty of thinking must be *superadded* to
some Systems of it, which is not super-
added to others.

1. That Position, which makes *all*
Matter to be cogitative, is contrary to
all the Apprehensions and Knowledge
we have of the Nature of it; nor can
it be true, unless our Senses and Facul-
ties be contriv'd only to *deceive* us.

2. The Faculties of thinking, &c. p. 187.
cannot arise from the *Size, Figure, Tex-*
ture, or Motion of it: Because Bodies
by the Alteration of these only become
greater or less, round or square, or the
like; all which *Ideas* are quite different
from that of *thinking*; there can be *no*
Relation

P. 189.

Relation between them. These Modifications and Affections of Matter are so far from being *Principles* or *Causes* of thinking and acting, that they are themselves but *Effects*, proceeding from the Action of some other Matter or Thing upon it, and are Proofs of it's Passivity, Deadness, and utter Incapacity of becoming *cogitative*. This is evident to Sense. Besides, since Magnitude, Figure, Motion, are but *Accidents* of Matter, not *Matter*, and only the *Substance* is truly Matter; and since the *Substance* of any one Part of Matter does not differ from that of another, if *any* Matter can be by Nature *cogitative*, *all* must be so. But this we have seen cannot be.

P. 191.

3. So then in Conclusion, if there is any such Thing as *Matter that thinks, &c.* a *Faculty of thinking* must be *superadded* to certain Parts or Parcels of it, which by the way, must infer the Existence of some Being able to confer this Faculty. But the Truth is, Matter seems not to be capable of such Improvement, of being made to think. For since it is not of the *Essence* of Matter, it cannot be *made to be so* without making Matter *another Kind* of Substance from what it is. It were to change Death into Life, Incapacity of thinking into Cogitativity, Necessity into Liberty. And to say, that

that God may *superadd* a Faculty of thinking, moving it's self, &c. to Matter, if by this be meant that he may make Matter to be the *Suppositum* of these Faculties (that Substance in which they inhere) is the same in Effect as to say, that God may superadd a Faculty of *thinking* to *Incogitavity*, of acting *freely* to *Necessity*, and so on. What Sense is there in this? And yet so it must be, while Matter continues to be Matter.

It is plain enough, that the *Mind*, P. 192. tho' it acts under great Limitations, doth however in many Instances govern the Body arbitrarily: And it is monstrous to suppose this Governour to be be nothing but some fit *Disposition* or *Accident* (superadded) of the Matter which is governed. A *Ship*, it is true, would not be fit for *Navigation*, if it was not built and provided in a proper Manner: But then, when it has it's proper Form, and is become a *System* of Materials fitly dispos'd, it is not this *Disposition* that governs it. It is the *Man*, that other Substance, who sits at the Helm, and they who manage the Sail and Tackle that do this. So *our Vessels*, without a proper Organization of Parts, would not be capable of being acted as they are; but still it is not the Shape, or Modification, or any other Accident

Accident that can govern them. The Capacity of being governed or us'd can never be the *Governour*, applying and using that Capacity. No, there must be at the Helm *something distinct* that commands the Body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather sink.

P. 193.

VII. *The Soul of Man subsists after the Dissolution of his Body, or, is immortal.* For being immaterial, it is indiscernible, and therefore incapable of being dissolv'd or demolish'd as Bodies are; such a Being can only perish by *Annihilation*: That is, it will continue to subsist and live, if some other Being, able to do this, doth not by a particular Act *annihilate* it. And if there be any Reason to believe, that at the Death of every Man there is always such a particular Annihilation, let him that knows it produce it. Even if the Soul *could be* material, this Matter must be so *perfectly united* in it's self, so absolutely *one*, (since all the Faculties and Acts of the Soul, or of the Mind, are all Faculties and Acts of the self-same Thing) that the *least* that can be allow'd is, that it should be truly solid, and not *actually divisible*; that is, such as no *natural Cause* can destroy. We may also conclude the Souls of Men to be immortal from the *Nature of God*: The *unequal Dispensations*

P. 194.

P. 199,
etc.

sations of Happiness or Misery here, shew that there will be a *just* Retribution in a *future State* from a *perfect* Being, who cannot but deal *reasonably* with all his Dependents. And if we consider that Corruption, Vice, Iniquity, Folly, at least prevail here; can any one with Reason imagine, that *Reason* should be given, tho' it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then *extinguish'd*? May we not rather conclude, that there must be *some World*, where *Reason* will have it's Turn, and prevail and triumph? Some Kingdom of *Reason* to come? Lastly, the general Consent of Mankind in an *Expectation* of continuing to live in another State, *beyond the Grave*, and the *Reasonableness* of that Expectation, is a farther Argument that there will be *such* a State. A Man may thus reasonably meditate with himself: I am a *Being* certainly superior to all other Creatures here, endu'd with reasoning Faculties, and capable of an *Expectation* to live in *another State*. Must I then only serve to furnish Dust, to be mingled with the Ashes of Herds and Plants, and with the Dirt under my Feet? This Argument grows *stronger* in the Apprehension of one, who is conscious of Abilities and *intellectual Improvements*, which he had no Opportunity here of shewing

I
or

P. 210. or using. It grows *stronger still* upon the Mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard Treatment he has met with without Cause from the World, cannot but make a *silent, humble Appeal* to that Being, who is his *last and true Refuge*, and who, he must believe, will not *desert him thus*. And it is the *strongest of all* to one, who besides all this, *endeavours* in the Conduct of his Life to observe the Laws of *Reason*, (that is, of his *Nature*; and that is, of the *Author of Nature*, upon whom he depends) laments, and labours against his own *Infirmities*; implores the *divine Mercy*, prays for some *better State* hereafter, acts and lives in the *Hopes* of one, and *denies* himself many Things upon that View: One, who, by the Exaltation of his *Reason*, and that, which is commonly the Effect of real and useful Philosophy, the Practice of *Virtue*, is still approaching towards a higher Manner of being, and doth already taste something spiritual and above this World. If these Meditations and Reflections are well grounded, it must be reasonable to think that God will satisfy a *reasonable Expectation*.

P. 212.

VIII. *The Soul when it parts from this gross Body, will pass by some Law into some new Seat or State, agreeable to the Nature*

Nature of it. Every Species of Beings must belong to *some* Region or State; and there being different Kinds of Abodes and Manners of subsisting in the Universe, and the *Natures* of Things being also different, each Species is *adjudg'd* to it's proper Place, by the Course of Nature and Constitution of Things, or rather by the Author of them. And so when the Soul is disengag'd from the Body, it must be either freed from the *Laws* of Bodies, and fall under *some other*, which will carry it to some *proper* Mansion or State; or at least by the *old ones* be capable of mounting upwards, in Proportion to the Volatility of it's Vehicle (according to the Author's Hypothesis, that the Soul is cloath'd in a *fine material* Vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were *inseparably* mix'd with it, *vid. p. 192, 193.*) and of emerging out of these Regions into some *Medium* more suitable. Thus much as to the *general State* of Souls after Death. But then,

IX. *In this new State, or Place of A-* p. 213:
bode, there may be different Stations besit-
ting the Differences of particular Souls a-
mong themselves, as they are more or less
perfect in their Kind. We see even in-
animate Bodies settle into some Order
among themselves, agreeable to their
I 2 diffe-

A Compendious View of the

different Gravities, Figures, Impulses, &c. And so by the same universal Rule in Nature (*viz.* that Differences in Things are attended with answerable Relations and Effects) Souls must also take their Situation in *some Kind* of Order, according to *their* Differences.

X. *The great Difference of human Souls, with Respect to Perfection and Imperfection, lies in their different Degrees and Habits of Reasonableness and Unreasonableness: That is, not only in Mens different Improvements, or Neglects and Abuse of their rational Faculties, but also in the greater or less Influence of these upon their Actions, and by Consequence in their different Degrees of Virtue and Vice. For a Man is accounted a reasonable Man, when he reasons rightly, and follows his Reason; in which Expression Virtue must be included, (vid. p. 179. and elsewhere) being nothing but the Practice of Reason and Truth.*

P. 214.

Now the Soul having *two* Faculties, *one*, by which it understands, and judges, and reasons; and *another*, by which it wills, or determines to act, according to the Judgments and Conclusions made in the upper Part of it; the more *perfectly* it performs these Operations, the more *perfect* certainly it must be in its Kind;

Kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The *Perfections* therefore of human Souls, and the *contrary*, must be in Proportion to the foremention'd *Differences*.

XI. *According to these Differences then, it is resonable to think that the Souls of Men will find their Stations in the future World.* This is but a Corollary from what goes before. Be sure the more advanc'd and pure any State is, the more *properly* will the Inhabitants be rank'd, and the *juster* and more *natural* will the Subordination of it's Members be. Then certainly those Fields or P. 215. States, in which the *virtuous* and *wise* shall meet, must be different from those in which the *foolish* and *wicked* shall herd together.

XII. *The Mansions and Conditions of the virtuous and reasoning Part, must be proportionably better than those of the foolish and vicious.* This must be true, if the Constitution of Things depends upon a reasonable Cause, as it has been shewn it does. Hence it follows, that the *Practice of Reason* (in it's just Extent) is the great Preparative for Death, and the Means of advancing our Happiness through all our subsequent Duration.

XIII. *In the future State Respect will be had not only to Mens reasoning and Virtues, or the contrary, but also to their Enjoyments and Sufferings here. Because the Inequalities of this World can by no Means be redress'd, unless Men's Enjoyments and Sufferings, taken together with their Virtues and Vices, are compar'd and balanc'd. I say, taken together; because no Reason can be assign'd, why a vicious Man should be recompenc'd, for the Mischiefs he brings upon himself by his Vices, as the natural Consequences of them: Nor on the other Side, why any Deductions should be made from the future Happiness of a good Man upon the Score of those innocent Enjoyments, which are the genuine Fruit of his Virtue, and sound Reasoning. Hence wicked Men will not only be less happy than the wise and virtuous, but be really unhappy in that State to come. For when all the Happiness that answers to those Degrees of Virtue, which they had, and those Sufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural Effect of their Wickedness; I say, when that is subtracted, what remains upon the Account will be something below no Happiness; which must be some Quantity of positive Unhappiness or Misery.*

P. 216.

Thus

Thus there will be *Rewards* and *Punishments* hereafter; and Men will be *happy*, or *unhappy*, according to their *Behaviour*, *Enjoyments* and *Sufferings* in this present Life. But,

XIV. *If the Immortality of the Soul cannot be demonstrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot.* To say, when a *House* is ruinous and fallen, that it once had an *Inhabitant*, and that he is escap'd out of it, and lives in some other Place, can involve no *Contradiction* or *Absurdity*. And,

XV. *If the Immortality of the Soul should be consider'd only as a Probability, or even as a Chance possible, yet still a virtuous Life is to be preferr'd before it's contrary.* For if the Soul be mortal, it is but a little that a good Man loses by his *Virtue*, very rarely more than some *Acts of Devotion*, or *Instances of Mortification*, which too by Custom grow habitual and easy, and it may be pleasant by being (or seeming at least to be) reasonable; and the vicious Man gains only such *Enjoyments*, as most commonly owe their Being to a vitiated Taste, grow insipid in Time, are clogg'd with some *Trouble* or other; and at best, after a short Time end in nothing, p. 217.
as if they had never been. But if the Soul

A Compendious View of the

proves *immortal*, the virtuous Man, besides that his press'd Pleasures, (if not so many) are more *sincere* and *natural*, gains the Happiness of another State, which may be presum'd to be *immortal*, because his Soul is so, and to be *truer* and *greater* than any of these low Enjoyments here, because that State is every way in Nature above this. And the wicked Man not only *loses* that Happiness, which the virtuous Man gains *as such*, but sinks besides into some Degree of the *Unhappiness* of that future State: Of which one may say in general, that it may be as much greater than the Unhappiness or Sufferings of this World, as the Happiness and Joys of that are above those of this.

Let this be added, that the *reasoning* and *virtuous* Man has at least this Advantage over the *foolish* and *profligate*, that his Wisdom and Virtue will find Means to *alleviate* his Pressures and Disadvantages, with *Comforts* of which the other knows nothing; particularly this, the Enjoyment of an humble, but well grounded Expectation of *Felicity hereafter*, sincere and durable.

P. 218.

XVI. *He therefore, who would act according to Truth, must, in the last place, not only consider what he is, and how circumstantiated in this present State, and*
provide

provide accordingly ; but farther, must consider himself also as one whose Existence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How this may be done, by this time may be fully apprehended.

For a *Conclusion* of the whole; let our Conversation in this World, so far as we are concern'd and able, be such as is agreeable to the *Truth* and *just Circumstances of Things*: That is, let us act according to *Reason* ; and that is, let us act according to the *Law of our Nature*. By *honestly endeavouring* to do this, we we shall express our Duty to *him*, who is the Author of it, and of that Law ; and at the same time prosecute our own *proper Happiness* (the Happiness of *rational Beings*) we shall do what tends to make us easy here, and be qualifying our selves, and preparing for our Removal hence to our long Home : That great *Revolution*, which at the farthest, cannot be very far off.



A N

APPENDIX

Concerning the

Christian Religion.



THUS, SIR, I have endeavoured to obey your Command, by giving you this View of the *Religion of Nature delineated*. I need say nothing to you, or to the World, of the Author's excellent Learning, great Abilities, and admirable Reasoning. It is only Pity, we have not from so great a Master, a just

An Appendix.

just *Pourtraiture* also of revealed Religion *, to vindicate it's divine Authority, and to do Justice to the great Principles of it. It is manifest, that it is absolutely necessary we should carry on our Enquiries farther, if there be in Fact any *revealed* Rule of our Faith and Practice. For there cannot be a more monstrous Absurdity, than to suppose Mankind at Liberty to reject, as they please, what is required of them by the supreme Author of their Being. I shall therefore beg leave to offer this small humble Tribute to the Service of the *Christian Religion*.

I. *It*

* I don't know indeed whether the Author did not so design his Answer by this Book, to the first and second Questions (at the beginning of it), as to supersede the Necessity of his saying any Thing to the third, not by teaching Men to be contented with natural Religion only, if there be any other that is revealed; (for the contrary is expressly his Doctrine, p. 211.) but by enabling them to judge rightly for themselves in all their subsequent Enquiries. It is certain the Principles of natural Religion are an excellent Rule, as far as they go, by which to judge of other Religions. For the Religion of Nature being founded on the Nature of Things, and by Consequence deriving it's Being, if I may so express it, from God, who is the Author of Nature, and containing Principles and Duties of eternal Obligation, I mean as long as the Nature of Things continue to be the same: Hence it follows, that whatever Religion is truly revealed from God, not only cannot

I. *It is reasonable to expect, that some revealed Religion should be given to Men. Because without such a Guide, Mankind would be left under too great Uncertainties in what concerns them most to know. It is true, the Religion of Nature, as delineated in this Book, is excellent and venerable, and may seem to some to suffice for the Duty and the Happiness of Men. But from whence was even this great Writer enabled to enlarge his Views and Prospects of it, and to give it so beautiful and large a Description, but from the Assistances*

cannot be contradictory to those Principles, but also must include them. And accordingly if there be any other Reason for the divine Authority of the Christian Religion, this Rule will certainly strengthen and confirm it, and lead us to comply with so excellent an Institution; as among all the various Sects into which it is divided (and 'tis the Nature of Men to be so divided) it will also enable us to discern that the Church of England is excellent in it's self, and at least equal to any other the best Churches upon Earth. I say, the Principles of natural Religion will teach us to do this, especially as they are explained and treated of in this Book. Need I therefore scruple to say, that this Book, tho' there is not one Word directly in it of either, is yet a noble Defence of the Christian Religion, and of the Church of England? But as this is probably what every one will not readily come into, it is allowable to wish, we had also an explicate Defence of both from so great a Writer, who had laid so well the Foundation for it.

he

he and others, who have writ on the same Subject before him, have received from the *Jewish* and *Christian* Institutions? Let any one judge, whether he could otherwise have writ as he has done, even supposing him acquainted with all the other Learning in the World. It will be in vain to say, that what he has advanced, is founded on Principles of *natural Reason*. For great is the Difference between discovering Truth *at the first*, and being able to demonstrate it's Reasonableness, when it has been *already* discovered. We may in many Instances be well qualify'd to do the one, when we are pretty much, if not altogether, incapable of the other. The ancient Heathen *Philosophers* wanted neither Inclination, nor Talents of Reason, for these or the like Enquiries. And since his Attainments and Reasoning are so much superior to theirs, is it not to be imputed to such Advantages, which *he* was, but *they* were *not*, acquainted with? But even if it were owing to his superior Genius, it is of little Advantage to the Bulk of Mankind, that *not* in every Age, or in every Countrey, but *now* and *then* only, and as it were by *Chance*, some great Man arises to demonstrate the Truth, and fix the Doctrines and Duties of *natural Religion*. And the Experience of the World hath

hath sufficiently shewn, and undoubtedly will always shew, how much Vice and Ignorance (Ignorance I mean in *true* Religion) are apt to prevail, where Men have *nothing else* but their *natural* Reason for their *Guide*. Besides, if but in one Case of Importance to us, we want some farther Guide, (as this Author was very sensible that we do, *p.* 211. and as some of the best and wisest of the ancient Philosophers also seem'd to be †) it is reasonable to expect that God should give it us; and certainly it must be reasonable to think, to use our Author's Language, *p.* 210. that God will satisfy a *reasonable Expectation*.

† — Sed ut homunculus unus è multis probabilia conjectura sequens, *Tull. Insc. quest. Lib. i. 9.* And again, Harum Sententiarum quæ vera sit, Deus aliquis viderit: quæ verisimillima, magna quæstio est, *Ibid. p. 11.* And Socrates in his Speech to his Judges, utrum autem (sc. vitam agere aut mori), dii immortales sciunt: hominem quidem scire arbitror neminem, *Ibid. 41.* And however Tully may speak here as an Academic, or Socrates only to retain his Manner to the last, not to affirm any thing; and tho' what with them was allow'd to be but probable, was pretty much equal to the Certainty of others; yet if we consider some at least of their reasoning on the Immortality of the Soul, it will I think be natural to conclude, that they wanted some farther Guide to give them greater Certainty of what they seem'd so desirous to believe.

II. *It has pleas'd God accordingly to reveal his Will to us by the Christian Institution, or, the Christian Religion is true. The Miracles which were wrought in Confirmation of it, the Completion of the ancient Prophecies concerning it, the Honesty and Integrity of the Promulgers of it, the speedy Propagation of it in the World, tho' contrary to the corrupt Customs and Manners of it, and notwithstanding all the Opposition it received from it, and lastly, the Truth and Excellency of those Things, which it teaches Men to believe and practise, are each of them singly a good Argument, and all of them together an invincible Proof of it's divine Authority.* For to reject a Religion with these Advantages, is to make the *God of Truth* to be a *Deceiver* (absurd and detestable Blasphemy!) or at the least implies that he is unconcern'd for Mankind, tho' they are his *Offspring*, were it only in permitting so many Things to concur in Favour of an Imposture, which must needs prevail on every honest and impartial Mind to believe it.

As to the *Miracles* wrought in Confirmation of Christianity, it's utter Enemies the *Jews*, I think, to this very Day confess them: And however they may by them or any other be denied, yet
we

we have most certain Reason to believe those Miracles were *indeed* performed, from the Manner of their Performance either before *Multitudes* of People, or *credible Witnesses*, and that even in numberless Instances, in all which it was not possible for any human Contrivance constantly to deceive; and from the *constant Tradition* of a Belief of them to this Day from the first Witnesses themselves, when, for some Ages at least, Men could have no Inducement to believe them, but the Conviction of their Truth: And the *Honesty and Integrity* of the Promulgers of Christianity, and Witnesses of the Miracles of it, appear in all the *Marks and Evidences* that one Man can give of his Integrity to another, and in particular not only by their having no Inducement to deceive, but sealing their Testimony even with their Blood; that is, by dying for it. And in some Cases at least, they could not possibly be deceived themselves, and particularly in our Saviour's Resurrection from the dead; which, as it is one of the great fundamental Articles of that Religion which they taught, so it is an invincible Proof of it's divine Authority.

As to the *Completion* in the New Testament of *Prophecies* in the Old, let

K

any

any reasonable and impartial Man judge, whether it is possible that such an Agreement of Things to ancient Predictions of divers Men, in divers Ages, and in so many Instances, could be the Result of Chance: For I think it is not pretended, that there was any human Contrivance either in forging those Prophecies, or those Events that are so correspondent thereunto. But vain Men may think as they please; I may venture to foretel, that notwithstanding the Efforts of impious Men, this will always be esteemed by the judicious and wise a great and excellent Proof of the Truth of the *Christian* Institution. Let me here also add, that the Prophecies likewise of the New Testament are an Argument of it's divine Authority to all ingenuous Men.

With these Advantages, in Concurrency with it's own internal *Excellency*, of which somewhat will be said immediately, it is, I confess, the less to be wonder'd at, that the *Christian Religion* was so *speedily propagated* in the World, notwithstanding all the Opposition it received from the Malice, and Power, and Policy of it's Enemies, as no Wonder it had, and still has Enemies in a distemper'd World. But without those Advantages, how is it possible it should have

have prevail'd, when there was nothing in it to matter, but a great deal that oppos'd, the corrupt Inclinations of Men; and when the first Preachers of it had no Advantages of human Learning, or worldly Policy to persuade or deceive, or Force of Arms to compel Men to become Converts to the *Christian Faith*, but on the contrary were persecuted, tho' innocent and defenceless, even unto Death? But they had indeed Advantages that were infinitely of greater Importance, and more proper for them: They had the utmost Honesty and Integrity of Mind: They had the Assistance of the Holy Spirit of God to prosper their noble and most beneficial Undertakings; and they had the Power of working Miracles, in Confirmation of that holy Religion of which they were the Preachers and Publishers. Such were the Means, by which both *Jews* and *Gentiles* were converted to the *Christian Faith* by the holy *Apostles*, and these were their *Credentials* to the World.

Lastly, since we have now seen the *Religion of Nature* drawn in so great Perfection by a masterly Hand, it is very proper, were it only upon that Account, here to remark, that the *Agreement* of the *Doctrines* and *Precepts*

of Christianity to those of best and most refined Reason *, is a noble Confirmation

* I suppose it will not be disputed, but that the holy Scriptures teach us the Being, the Unity, the Providence, and the Perfection of God, and that he is to be worshipped by us; that they teach us Justice and Charity towards Men, and forbid all Unmercifulness, Cruelty and Revenge; that they teach us to restrain all our unreasonable Passions and Desires; and lastly, that they teach us a future State of Rewards and Punishments. These are the main Doctrines and Duties of the Religion of Nature; and if it be made at all an Objection, that these Writings moreover teach us other Doctrines, and enjoin us other Duties, which are not deducible from our natural Reason, it will vanish, when we consider, that, if they are reveal'd from God, it is reasonable to expect that they should teach us some farther Truths, and enact some farther Laws than those which are discoverable only by the Light of Nature. As to the Doctrines which are taught in the holy Scriptures, somewhat has been said already; and to shew the Reasonableness of the Duties they enjoin, let us consider that the Precepts either of the Jewish or Christian Religions, which are not of moral Obligation, are either some positive Rites or Institutions, or temporal Precepts given for a particular Time or Purpose, or such, as though they are of continual Obligation, yet seem, or really do lay some Restraint on Men in some Things allowable by the Religion of Nature, or oblige them to greater Heights of Duty than this may require. As to the first, such as the Passover, and other Rights among the Jews, and Baptism and the Lord's Supper among Christians, it is easy to discern the Reason of the Institution of most of them, at least in the Condition and Circumstances of the People to whom they were given, or the Nature of that Religion of which they

tion of it's Truth. For it is utterly incredible in the Nature of Things, that

they are Parts. And if perhaps we are not able at this Distance of Time to discover the Reason of some of the Jewish Rights, it were Perverseness to imagine there were no good Reason for their Institution, when we can discern a Reason for the Institution of of the rest, and when moreover it is no Wonder we are often so unqualify'd to make a proper Judgment in Things of so remote Antiquity. For the second, such as the Command to the Israelites to spoil the Egyptians, or to destroy the Canaanites in the Old Testament, and that of our Saviour in the New, to the young Man to sell all that he had, and to follow him; to be convinc'd that these are perfectly just, it will suffice to recollect that God is the supreme Lord and Proprietor of all; and if earthly Princes have in many Cases a just Power over the Lives and Fortunes of their People, how much more must that Power be in him, whose Servants and whose Creatures they and the whole World are? And for the last, such as the Precepts of loving our Enemies, not resisting Evil, or contending for smaller Matters of the Law, or the like; when these are rightly understood, they will appear to be highly excellent, and when duly practis'd, will entitle us to a greater Reward; inasmuch as they exalt and improve our Virtue, by implanting in us not only a perfect Innocency of Temper, but a beneficent Disposition even to those who injure us; while at the same Time in Matters of any Consequence they by no Means debar us of any just or legal Defence; nor in any Case do they require us to esteem our Enemies to be our Friends, or to confide in them as such. And if any shall suggest that the Observance of these Precepts, will the more expose us to Evils, let it suffice to observe, that 'tis impossible we can have a more desirable Security from Evils, than that which arises from our Innocency and Goodness, and our Title to the Protection of God.

Men of no Advantages of *human Learning*, nor of *speculative Lives*, should of themselves find out the finest and noblest Rules of Morality, and teach the most rational and sublime Doctrines of GOD, of his *Providence*, of a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*, when it is by *Philosophy and assiduous Reasoning*, and a Life of *Leisure and Contemplation*, that Men of *Learning* find out and demonstrate, in any Degree of Perfection, the Truth and Reasonableness of them. It will be in vain to object, that there are Doctrines of *Christianity* above our Comprehension, when it appears that there are also such, and must be, in the *Religion of Nature*, vid. p. 69. & 93. and even that there are numberless Mysteries even in Nature it's self. And the Mysteries of Christianity, however in some Respects above our poor finite Comprehension, yet in others are agreeable to the most perfect Reason. And let it be remembred, that one of the principal Causes of *Error* our Author assigns, is Mens pretending to judge of Things above them, and thence denying what there is the highest Reason to believe, only because they cannot comprehend it, p. 59 †.

† I beg leave to say somewhat here of the Doctrine of the Trinity. Our Author has prov'd that the Manner of God's Existence is above all our Conceptions,

III. *The Christian Religion being true, it is to be believed and obey'd.* For not to do this, is direct Rebellion against God, who is the Author of it. Besides, as it expressly *requires* our Belief and Obedience, we must be therefore, if it be
true,

tions, and that his *Essence* or *Nature* is to us altogether incomprehensible, p. 69, 93. He has also observ'd, that as God is a pure, uncompounded Being, his *Attributes* of Mercy, Justice, &c. cannot be as we conceive them, because in him they are one, p. 116. What from hence I would observe, is, that there can be no Reason to reject the Doctrine of the Trinity, if it fairly appears, as surely it does appear to be taught us in the holy Scriptures. For if it be above our Comprehension, so is the divine Nature or *Essence*; and if his Manner of being is to us altogether incomprehensible (to use our Author's Words, p. 93) shall we presume to determine that he cannot exist in three Persons, but in one only? It will be said perhaps, that this implies a Contradiction: But our esteeming it so, arises only from our forming the same Notion of the Word Person in the divine Nature, as when it is apply'd to the human. It is not pretended that our Expressions in this Mystery are by any Means adequate, or particularly that the Word Person is so. If it be therefore ask'd what Notion we have of it in this Mystery; we can say, without the least Diminution of the Truth of the Doctrine, that we are by no means able justly to explain, or even conceive it, any more than it is a Diminution of God's Justice and Mercy, &c. when we own that we know not what those Words mean in respect of him. And as we know not how three Persons subsist in the Unity of the Godhead, so perhaps we are equally unable to account how Attributes in themselves, according to our Apprehension,
K 4 distinct,

*true, obliged to believe and obey it. And this is also a manifest Consequence from that which is the prevailing Thought in this Book. For, to use the Author's own Words, whatever is immediately reveal'd from God, must, as well as any thing else, be treated as being what it is; which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest Regard, believ'd and obey'd **, p. 211. Wherefore,

IV. *Those*

distinct, should be essentially in one pure, uncompounded Being. And yet what Blasphemy and Madness were it, for any one for that Reason to deny, that God is merciful, just, wise, &c. If therefore lastly it be ask'd, why we use the Word Person at all, when we own we have not, nor can have any adequate Idea in this Mystery of what it means; the Answer is, because it is the best that we know of to express that Manner of Existence in which the one God is represented to us in the holy Scriptures, that is, in such a Manner as we would represent three distinct Persons to one another here on Earth. In like Manner as we say that God is just, merciful, &c. though he cannot be so in that Sense as Justice, Mercy, &c. are conceiv'd by us. And we must be contented to speak but as well as we can in what is infinitely above us; and in our Notions and Expressions of our incomprehensible, infinite Creator, a great deal must be indulg'd to the Infirmities and Imperfection of our poor mortal Nature.

** I chuse to transcribe the whole of what our Author has said here relating to reveal'd Religion, and I would have the Reader observe it well. Here, says he, I begin to be very sensible how much I want*

IV. *Those who have the Opportunities of knowing the Christian Religion, and of being convinc'd of it's Truth, ought by no Means to trust their Souls even with the best Morality exclusive of it. Because this is the Method which the great Author of Nature and Morality has appointed for our Duty and our Happiness. And it's well we have such an Institution to trust to, wherein God himself is pleased to teach us what Notions we ought to have of him, and what it is he requires of us: An Institution, by which we are assur'd that we poor sinful Creatures have a divine Person, who is at the same Time also of our own Nature, to reconcile us to God, in whom we may safely*

*want a Guide. But as the Religion of Nature is my Theme, I must at present content my self with that Light which Nature affords; my Business being, as it seems, only to shew what a Heathen Philosopher, without any other Help, and almost *avte-didaxtō*, may be supposed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing else contain'd in this Delineation, can be the least Prejudice to any other true Religion. Whatever is immediately reveal'd from God, must, as well as any thing else, be treated as being what it is: Which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest Regard, believed and obey'd. That therefore, which has been so much insisted on by me, and is as it were the Burthen of my Song, is so far from undermining true reveal'd Religion, that it rather paves the Way for it's Reception. Thus I take this Opportunity to remark to you once for all. p. 211.*

trust,

trust, if with sincere Minds we *repent* of what we have done amiss, and *honestly endeavour* to obey him. Let any *well-disposed Man* say, whether he has not Reason to wish he had some *such* Institution to trust to. The *Sinner*, who is conscious of his *Guilt*, and dreads the Consequences of it, may *certainly* be glad, that *hitherto* he can, and is even invited to flee for Refuge. And we have the greater Inducement to obey this divine Institution, because it is the Practice of *Truth and Reason* (that is, the Practice of *such* Things as are fit for us in our Condition and Circumstances to do) and the Way to *Happiness*, that it requires of us. For,

V. And lastly, *The Practice of Reason and Truth, the Way to Happiness, and the Practice of Christianity, where it is taught and known, incur the one into the other* †. For to believe and obey a Religion *reveal'd from God*, must of Necessity be an Obedience to *Truth and Reason*, and an infallible *Way* to our utmost *Felicity*. For no Religion can come from him, but what is true in it's self, *reasonable* and proper for us, and conducive to our *Happiness*. And accordingly the

† Jesus saith unto him, I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life, *Joh. xiv. 6.*

Christian Religion, upon the strictest Examination will appear to be so. This Book is a Testimony of it's Excellency, so far as it comprehends the *Religion of Nature*; and those who know it well, cannot but discern that it is no less, but rather much more venerable and excellent, where it goes beyond it. So that the *Christian Religion* is not a *Diminution*, but an *Improvement* of our Reason; nor does it destroy, but heighten the *Religion of Nature*. And whoever has gone so far, as this excellent Book can teach him, is so far in a proper Disposition for it's Reception *.

Wherefore

* I believe the same Causes that prejudice Men against Christianity, must also prejudice them against the Religion of Nature, at least if it were settled and establish'd, notwithstanding the Pretences of some for it, to cover the Hideousness of their Infidelity. Thus, if I mistake not (for I have not the Book by me at present) the Author of the Rights of the Christian Church, seemingly allows, if not contends, that those who deny the Being of God, or a Providence, ought not, or have no Right, to be tolerated in Society. Yet I have Reason to believe that Author to be a Spinosist, that is, a gross Atheist. For which I appeal to the Sentiments of those that know him well. By this, unless my Opinion of him is wrong, we may judge of that Set of Men. However, as to what I said first, I take the Causes of Infidelity to be either one or more of these four, viz. a vain Fondness for singular Opinions, an Unwillingness to comply with the Morality of the Gospel, enforced upon them by so severe Denunciations, the
Super-

Wherefore in my Opinion, great Esteem of this Book, and great Respect for it's Author, is due from those who have Value not only for the *Religion of Nature*, but also for the *Christian Institution*. And since some seem not to have too favourable Notions of the Design of this Book, it will not be improper to say somewhat here in Defence of the Author, were it only in *Justice*, as I conceive

Superstition, Hypocrisy or Knavery of some of it's Votaries, and lastly, the Pride of Men in not submitting to believe what they cannot comprehend. As for the first, there would be the same Occasion for the Vanity of Men to shew it's self, if the Religion of Nature were the common Religion; and certainly if that only were in the World, the Errors, and Vices, and monstrous Superstitions, and Falshood of Men, which in all Ages they are too apt to cover under the Notion of Religion, would not be less than what is now in the World. We may appeal for this to the Times of Heathenism, even not excepting those Times when Learning among them flourish'd. And as to the Unwillingness of Men to comply with the Rules of the Gospel, and the Severity of it's Denunciations, it is plain that Vice is condemn'd by natural, as well as reveal'd Religion; and we find that future Punishments as well as Rewards is a Doctrine of the one, as it is of the other. And what Madness is it for Men by a vicious or wicked Life to run the Hazard of those Punishments, unless the vain Notions of Men could be supposed to alter the Nature of Things, or disannull the Declarations of God himself? Wicked and profane Men should therefore consider, that if there are

conceive it is but Justice, to his Memory. It is true, he has said nothing expressly of the *Christian Religion*; but as he expressly says, that the Religion of *Nature* is his Theme, so what he says there implies that there is some farther Light than that which *Nature* affords, and particularly expresses his Hope that nothing he has done in this *Delineation* can be the least Prejudice to any other true Religion: Nay, that what he has done, is so far from undermining true reveal'd Religion, that it rather paves the Way for it's Reception, p. 211. Would any one say these Things, if he believ'd there were no reveal'd Religion at all,

are Punishments appointed for such Men in a future State, their perverse Disbelief of them is no Ways likely to prevent them. And if they are resolv'd to go on in their own Ways, they ought to be very sure that no future Evils will ensue. As to those Punishments, we may say in general, of what Nature soever they are, that they will be such only as Men will deserve, and as are fit for an infinitely wise and reasonable Being to inflict upon them. And whatever they are, the Influence they ought to have upon us is, that we take the proper Method to escape them; and we may certainly escape them by the Practice of Reason and Truth (which to us includes the Practice of Christianity) or by our sincere and true Repentance and Return when we have gone astray. As to the last Cause I mention'd of Infidelity, viz. the Pride of Men in not submitting to believe what they cannot comprehend, I refer the Reader to what I have said above, p. 72, 73.

unless he *prevaricated*; an Imputation surely injurious to this Author, who not only so much contends for *Truth*, but whom we have all the Reason to believe from this Book, to be no less a sincere and excellently virtuous, than a great, Man. And when the Reader has moreover consider'd his frequent Quotations of the Fathers, and sometimes too of the Scriptures, not as an Enemy would quote them (unless perhaps we except his Usage, in a certain Place, of *Tertullian*, who certainly there deserved to be used with some Severity; and for whom, as having fallen into *Montanism*, we have the less Reason to be concern'd): If he considers his speaking of the Name by which God calls himself in *Moses's* History, p. 68. Notes, (which were too favourable, not to say an *untrue*, Way of speaking, if he believ'd that God never spake at all to *Moses*;) His speaking of *invisible* and *superior* Beings as *Ministers* (in the Language of the Scripture) of God's Providence; and that there may be of these many Orders, rising in Dignity of Nature and Amplitude of Power, p. 107, 108. agreeably to the Doctrine of *reveal'd Religion*: His Use of the Words *Trials*, *Temptations*, *Mortifications*, *Self-denial*, *Repenting* and *Forgiveness*, p. 121, 175, 176, 216. more certainly the Language of

of a *Christian Divine*, than a *Heathen Philosopher*: His determining for *pre-conceiv'd Forms of Prayer*, p. 124. a *Dispute* I think among *Christians* only, and his condemning *customary Swearing*, no where that I know of prohibited in any *Heathen Religion*, or by any *Heathen Philosopher*, p. 126. *Notes*. His Mention of the *Christian Church*, and her *Martyrologies*, p. 202. and his calling this somewhere a *distemper'd World*, agreeably to our Opinion of the Corruption of human Nature consequent upon the Fall of Man: His banishing of *Ostentation*, and *needless Repetitions* from our Prayers, p. 122, 124. according to our Saviour's Doctrine: The Manner in which he has mention'd the Form of Solemnization of Matrimony among us, p. 157. *Notes*: And lastly, his seeming to include himself in the Number of *Christian Divines*, where he is mentioning the two *Tables of the Law*, p. 164. *Notes*: I say, when the Reader has consider'd these Things, I think he may be trusted what Opinion to form of the Author's Sentiments in Relation to *Christianity*. I do not pretend to have enumerated every Thing that might be proper on this Occasion to, be referr'd to. Somewhat more of this Kind might be added, if it were necessary; but the whole are but such Things as I could
recol-

recollect, or observe by a very cursory Review. However, I am not willing to omit taking Notice of the Author's Manner of treating such as the professed Enemies of *Christianity* are, which is certainly not with that Favourableness as might have been expected from one, who was in any respect of their Number. So very much, says he in in one Place, are those Gentlemen mistaken, who by *following Nature*, mean only complying with their bodily Inclinations, &c. p. 13. And in another, thus Men, says he, affecting to appear Free-thinkers, shew themselves to be but half Free-thinkers, or *less*, p. 20. And again, speaking of the System of *Spinoza*, as *apparently* false and full of Impieties and Contradictions, he justly wonders, that such gross Atheism as this should ever be fashionable, p. 76. *Notes*. Elsewhere he tells us, he cannot without a Degree of Indignation find a sort of Writers pleasing themselves with having discover'd some unciviliz'd Nations, which have little or no Knowledge of the Deity, &c. and then applying their Observations to the Service of Atheism; as if Ignorance could prove any Thing, or alter it's Nature by being general, p. 58. *Notes*. Nor lastly, is he any ways favourable to *Epicurus* or his Followers, who in
some

some Respects surely are the favourite Sect of our *modern Infidels*. He says, that “ in Fact the Generality of *Epicurus’s* Herd have sunk into gross “ Voluptuousness, notwithstanding all “ his Talk of Temperance, Virtue, Tran- “ quillity of Mind”, &c. p. 24. And in the Notes, he says, that “ their “ Pleasures have not continued to be “ always like those in the little Gardens “ of *Gargettus*. Nor indeed that they “ do seem so very virtuous even “ there”, &c. And in p. 54. he says, “ to think the Sun is not bigger than “ it appears to the Eye to be”, (which was *Epicurus’s* Opinion and his Followers; “ *Tantulus ille — Sol*, *Lucr.* “ Poor Creature”! as he says in the Notes) “ seems to be the last Degree “ of Stupidity. He must be a Brute, “ so far from being a Philosopher, who “ does not know”, &c. I don’t know how the Author of the Discourse of *Free-thinking* can forgive him, for using so scurvily one of his favourite Free-thinkers amongst the Ancients.

After all, whatever becomes of the Opinion of any one Man, or Number of Men, *the Foundation of God standeth sure.* He cannot be a Liar, and we know it is he that speaks to us by the *Christian* Institution. Wherefore let us rejoice in so great a Blessing and Privilege,

L

which

which he hath vouchsafed to us. Let us comply with this divine Institution, with that *Chearfulness* and *ready Obedience* which it's *Authority* and it's *Excellency* demand. When we have done amiss, let us *turn to God*, and *trust in his Mercy*. By *honestly endeavouring* to do these Things, we shall express our Duty to him, who is the Author of that holy Institution, and of our Being; and at the same Time make the only *true Provision* for the just Peace and Tranquillity of our mortal Lives here, and for our obtaining a happy Immortality hereafter.

And now, Sir, your Trouble is almost over: Part of it you have brought upon your self, as being what you *desired* from me; and for this *Appendix*, let me leave it with you, as an *humble Monument* of one that meant well. I seem to my self to have now some Right to speak in our Author's Language. I will therefore make no Apology for doing so. However, I assure you, your good Opinion of what I have done, will be very agreeable to me: But whatever you shall think of it, you will please to receive it kindly, as a sincere Testimony of that Respect and Friendship, with which I am,

S I R,

Your most obedient,
and obliged humble Servant,

P O S T S C R I P T.

MR. Wollaston's Poem on *Ecclesiastes* was not come to my Hands, till after I had writ this *Appendix*. It is in my Opinion a Curious Book: I speak not of it's *Poetry*, and therefore I hope the Poets will not condemn me for this Judgment. However, the Reader need only look into a few Passages of that Book, to be convinc'd of the Author's Sentiments in relation to *reveal'd Religion*. I wish that the making any Defence for him at all in this Respect, may not be an Injury to his Memory. My Apology for it is, that to some there seems to be some Necessity for it. To these Men I take Leave to observe, that we can never do *Christianity Service*, by charging great Men wrongfully with any Opinions, or Designs that are injurious to it. The Enemies of our Faith will be glad to have such Men thought to be of their Side, and will not fail to make their Advantages of it. *Truth*, by whomsoever, or for what End soever advanc'd, can be no Prejudice to that which is of divine Original, and proceeds from the Fountain of *Truth* and Reason. And if any great Man happens in some Things to be mistaken, let him not be treated

as an Enemy for it, especially when there is no Appearance of any ill Design: And none surely ought to be suspected of ill Designs, without at least some very probable Appearance of them. And in smaller Opinions let us never shew a greater Zeal, than those Opinions deserve. By such a Temper, in my Judgment, we shall not only do that which is reasonable and proper in it's self, and agreeable to the Spirit of *Christianity*, but also best consult the Interest of this our holy Religion too.

24 OC 64



THE




THE CONTENTS.

SECT. I. Of Moral Good and Evil. Page 1

1. **A**cts merally good or evil must be those of an intelligent and free Agent. 2
2. Those Propositiions are true, which express Things as they are. *ibid.*
3. Truth may be denied by Deeds, as well as by Words. *ibid.*
4. No Act of an intelligent or free Agent, that interferences with Truth, can be right. 4
5. Omissions also contrary to Truth, must be wrong. 5
6. In Order to judge rightly what any Thing is, it must be consider'd in all those it's Circumstances, which may be contradicted by Prattice. 8
7. The forbearing of a wrong Act must be right; likewise, when the Omission of any thing is wrong, the doing of it must be right. *ibid.*
8. Moral Good and Evil are co-incident with right and wrong. *ibid.*

The Contents.

9. *All Acts therefore and Omissions contrary to Truth are morally evil in some Degree or other. The forbearing such Acts, and the acting in Opposition to such Omissions are morally good. And when any Thing may be either done, or not, equally without the Violation of Truth, that Thing is indifferent.* 9
10. *If there be moral Good and Evil distinguish'd as before, there is natural Religion. The great Law of which is,* 12
11. *A Conformity to Truth.* 13




SECT. II. Of Happiness. p. 19.

1. *Pleasure is a Consciousness of something agreeable, Pain of the contrary.* *ibid.*
2. *Pleasures and Pains are proportionable to the Perceptions and Sense of the Persons affected with them. Hence,* *ibid.*
3. *Princes, Lawgivers, Judges, Juries and Masters ought to be very judicious and wary; and* 20
4. *In general, all ought to be very careful and tender, where any another is concern'd.* 21
5. *Pain is a real Evil, and to be avoided; Pleasure a real Good, and desireable.* 22
6. *As Pleasure may be compared with Pain, &c. so when Pleasures and Pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: When the one exceeds, the Excess gives the true Quantity of Pleasure or Pain. Hence* 22, 23
7. *Some Pleasures, compared with what attends or follows them, may even degenerate to Pain; and some Pains may be unnumbered to Pleasures.* 23
8. *Any Being may be said to be so far happy as his Pleasures are true.* *ibid.*
9. *Those*

The Contents.

9. *Those Pleasures are true, against which there lies no Reason.* 28
10. *The Way to Happiness and the Practice of Truth incur the one to the other.* *ibid.*



SECT. III. *Of Reason, and the Ways of discovering Truth.* 27

1. *Reason is a Faculty of making just Inferences from any thing known or given.* 29
2. *There is such a thing as right Reason.* *ibid.*
3. *To act according to right Reason, and according to Truth, are in effect the same thing.* 30
4. *To be govern'd by Reason is the general Law impos'd on rational Beings. Hence,* 31
5. *Since the Practice of Reason, and that of Truth are in effect the same thing, the Truth of what was said Sect. I. Prop. IV. hereby further appears with respect to a rational Being, &c.* *ibid.*
6. *The Reports of Sense, tho' not of equal Authority with the clear Determinations of Reason, when they happen to differ, yet may be taken for true, when there is no Reason against it.* 34
7. *When Certainty is not to be had, we are to follow Probability.* 35




SECT. IV. *Of the Obligations of imperfect Beings with respect to their Power of acting.*

1. *The Obligations of moral Agents must be proportionable to their Powers and Opportunities.* 39
2. *To*

The Contents.

2. To endeavour may fitly express the use of those Opportunities and Powers. Wherefore, ibid.
3. It is the Duty of all sincerely to endeavour to practise Reason and Truth. ibid.



SECT. V. Truths relating to the Deity. Of his Existence, &c. 40

1. When there is a Series of Causes and Effects, there must be a Cause prior to the rest, uncaused. ibid.
2. Such a Cause or Being must be self-existent. 43
3. There must be such a Being. ibid.
4. Such a Being must be not only eternal, but infinite. ibid.
5. His Manner of Existence is above all our Conceptions. 44
6. He exists in a Manner that is perfect. ibid.
7. There can be but one such Being. 45
8. All other Beings depend upon him. 47
9. He is therefore the Author of Nature. ibid.
10. He is that Being whom we mean by the Word God. 48
11. God cannot be Corporeal. ibid.
12. Neither infinite Space, nor infinite Duration, &c. can be God. 49
13. There could be no such thing as either Matter or Motion without him. ibid.
14. The Frame and Constitution of the World, &c. shew an Almighty Designer, an infinite Wisdom and Power. 50
15. Life, &c. shew the Existence of some superior Being, from whom they are derived. 57
16. God is free from all Defects. 61
17. We may consider God, as operating in the Production and Government of the World, and may draw Conclusions from his Works. 62
18. God,

The Contents.

18. God, who gave Existence to the World, does also govern it by his Providence. 63
19. To behave our selves aright towards God, we must observe these and the like Particulars.
 1. Not to represent him by any Image whatsoever. 72
 2. Our Thoughts and Words of him ought to be in the most reverent Terms, and most proper Manner we are able. *ibid.*
 3. We are bound to worship him in the best Manner we can. 77
 4. Rational Beings should consider in earnest what a mighty Being he is, who has laid them under an Obligation of being govern'd by their Reason, and whose Laws the Dictates of right Reason may be said to be. 82




SECT. VI. Truths respecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human Laws. 84

1. Every Man is so distinguish'd from all others, as renders him and them capable of distinct Properties in Things. *ibid.*
2. There are some Things, in which every individual Man has such a natural Property, that he only of all Mankind can call them his. *ibid.*
3. Whatever is inconsistent with the general Good of Mankind is wrong, intolerable. 85
4. Whatever is either reasonable or otherwise in one, would be so in another, in respect to each other, if the Case was inverted. *ibid.*
5. In a State of Nature Men are equal in respect of Dominion 86
6. No Man can have a right to invade the Rights of another, who has given him no Cause so to do. *ibid.*
7. Yet

The Contents.

7. *Yet every Man has a right to Self-defence.* 87
8. *The first Possession of a thing, gives the Possessor a Right to it.* 88
9. *A Title to many things may be transferred by Compact or Donation.* *ibid.*
10. *There is such a thing as Property, founded in Nature and Truth.* *ibid.*
11. *To usurp the Property of another Man is Injustice. To render and permit quietly to every one what is his, is Justice.* 89
12. *All Injustice is evil.* *ibid.*
13. *So are Unmercifulness and Cruelty.* 90, 91
14. *From what is gone before may be deduc'd the Heinousness of Murder, Robbing, &c.* 91



SECT. VII. *Truths respecting particular Societies of Men, or Governments.* 94

1. *Man is a social Creature.* *ibid.*
2. *The end of a Society is the common Good of the People associated..* *ibid.*
3. *A Society supposes some Rules or Laws of Government.* 95
4. *These Laws must be not inconsistent with natural Justice.* *ibid.*
5. *A Society limited by Laws, supposes a Government of some Form or other.* *ibid.*
6. *A Man may part with some of his natural Rights, to gain the Privileges of a regular Society.* 96
7. *Men may become Members of a Society, either by an explicite or implicate Consent.* *ibid.*
8. *Every Member of a Society, ought to observe the Laws of it.* 97
9. *In things left undetermin'd by the Laws, he retains his natural Liberty.* *ibid.*
10. *War is lawful.* 98


SECT.

The Contents.



SECT. VIII. *Truths concerning Families and Relations.* 99

1. *The End of Marriage is the Propagation of Mankind, &c.* ibid.
2. *Marriages are made by some solemn Contract, &c.* ibid.
3. *Marrying without prospect of true Happiness, Adultery, &c. are all wrong.* 100
4. *Parents ought to educate their Children, &c.* 101
5. *There must be an Authority lodg'd by Nature in Parents over their Children.* ibid.
6. *Much Respect and Piety is due from Children to their Parents.* 103
7. *The natural Affection between Parents and Children, and other Relations, ought to be follow'd, when there is no Reason to the contrary.* 104



SECT. IX. *Truths belonging to a private Man, and respecting (directly) only himself.* 105

1. *Man is not only a rational Animal, but endued with Liberty, &c.* ibid.
2. *He ought therefore according to his Nature to do such Things as these.*
 1. *Subject his Passions to Reason.* 106
 2. *Not bring upon himself Want, &c. but endeavour*

The Contents.

- | | |
|--|-------|
| endeavour to prevent them. | 107 |
| 3. Many times hearken to his bodily Inclinations. | ibid. |
| 4. Use what Means he can to cure his own Defects, &c. | 108 |
| 5. Examine his Conduct, and repent of what he has done amiss. | 109 |
| 6. Labour to improve his rational Faculties by such Means, as are consistent with his Condition. | 110 |
| 7. Attend to Instruction, and ask Advice, especially in Matters of Consequence. | ibid. |
| Lastly, Labour to clear his Mind of Prejudices. | ibid. |
| | |
| 3. Every Man is oblig'd to live piously and virtuously. | 111 |
| 4. Every one is conscious of his own Life, and Power of thinking, &c. | 114 |
| 5. That which thinks (or the Soul) must be something different from the Body. | ibid. |
| 6. The Soul cannot be mere Matter. | 115 |
| 7. It is immortal. | 118 |
| 8. When it parts from the Body, it will pass into some new State, agreeable to it's Nature. | 120 |
| 9. In this new State, there may be different Stations, according as particular Souls are more or less perfect in their kind. | 121 |
| 10. They are more or less perfect, according to their different Degrees and Habits of Reasonableness and Unreasonableness | 122 |
| 11. According to these Differences we may reasonably think the Souls of Men will find their Stations in another World. | 123 |
| 12. The Conditions of the virtuous and reasoning Part, must be proportionably better than those of the vicious and foolish. | ibid. |
| 13. If the Immortality of the Soul cannot be demonstrated, yet the contrary cannot. | 125 |
| 14. If it be only probable that the Soul is immortal, | or |

The Contents.

or even as a Chance possible, yet still a virtuous
Life is preferable to it's contrary: ibid.

15. He therefore that would act according to Truth,
should make Provision not only for his Happiness
here, but hereafter. 127



APPENDIX. 129

1. **I**T is reasonable to expect there should be some
reveal'd Religion. 131
2. It has pleas'd God accordingly to reveal his Will
to us by the Christian Institution. 134
3. The Christian Religion being so reveal'd, it is to
be believ'd and obey'd. Wherefore, 141
4. Those to whom it is propos'd, ought by no means
to trust their Souls even with the best Morality
without it. 143
5. The Practice of Reason and Truth, the Way to
Happiness; and the Practice of Christianity,
where it is taught and known, are in effect the
same thing. 144
6. Conclusion; Containing an Apology for the Au-
thor of the Religion of Nature delineated; and a
short Exhortation to an Obedience to Christiani-
ty. 146

Postscript. 153

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

PAge 35. l. 22. r. *retain.* p. 59. l. 23. r. *And that there is.* and l. 30. r. *Flood.* p. 80. l. 7. r. *Mind freed.* p. 118. l. 10. r. *indiscernible.* p. 126. l. 2. r. *present Pleasures.* p. 139. l. 5. r. *Rites.* and l. 24. r. *at the Law.* p. 147. l. ult. r. p. 140. p. 150. l. 16. r. *Half-thinkers.*

Lately Publish'd.

AN Essay in the Socratick Way
of Dialogue, on the Existence
of a Divine Being, in Imitation of
Tully's Tusculan Questions. With
Notes. By *Roger Davies*, Master
of the Free-School in *Carmarthen.*

24 OC 64

